Sunday, March 06, 2011

Randy White's Estoppel Letter 1.8 - Arrow to the Achilles Heel of the IRS



Please do not try to make the letter into anything more than what it is intended for, which is a means showing good faith in trying to comply with the internal revenue laws and for shutting the DOJ up when it comes time to litigate the merits of one's own self-assessment versus a bogus IRS assessment not conforming to the definitions in IRC section 3121.

The "It is true, is it not," language is from common law, and is used because the Administrative Procedures Act does not authorize any request for admissions.
Authority for request for admissions comes under the civil rules of procedure for discovery, which does not apply under the APA in administrative procedure.

I stay away from the "person" issue because I do not see any remedy in it, no matter how right one may be in their argument. In the context of actually having remedy and good case law, then the "person" argument may get traction. But until then, I see it as another looser. Regarding the meaning of "includes", point 10 of the estoppel letter cites the U.S. Supreme Court's definitive explanation of the meaning of "includes" when used in the IRC.

I am in this game strictly to win. This means that in virtually every IRS matter we will be filing a criminal complaint under IRC section 7214(a) and taking our criminal complaints to our state attorney general by group, meaning 6 or more at a time. We will give the state attorney general notice that we will check back in 30 days, and if our criminal complaints are not being prosecuted, then every one of us will file a 42 USC § 1983 deprivation of civil rights lawsuit against the state attorney general. 

If filed, our 42 USC § 1983 suits will put the state's errors and omissions insurance in jeopardy, resulting in the state preferring to lose the attorney general rather than losing its insurance, which it must have to operate. No judge can dismiss any of our civil rights suits without becoming named as a defendant to the suit. Press coverage is easy to get for civil rights lawsuits, especially when the underlying criminal complaints are against IRS, DOJ and federal and state judges engaged in official misconduct. The templates will be forthcoming.

I stay strictly with the merits of liability based on the material facts within our personal knowledge corresponding to the definition for "employment" in IRC section 3121. I choose this approach because it conforms to the basic principles of federal income taxation under the Constitution, and is explicitly reasonable, especially in the eyes of a grand jury. A grand jury is ultimately our target audience because our only real remedy with IRS abuse is section 7214(a), which must be turned into an indictment prior to actual prosecution.

There are those who criticize the estoppel letter, such as Tally, but the fact is that the DOJ evades the points in the letter like the plague. If these points were in error, the DOJ would be the first to point it out. But they do not, and are silent. Silence from these lying criminals is golden.

The points in the estoppel letter support the following statement of the issue and discussion of the issue:
Statement of the Issue
1.  The issue in this case is whether John Doe received remuneration during the year 20xx which is properly reportable on the IRS Form 1040 as “wages, salaries, tips, etc.” or "self-employment income" through “employment” as defined at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b), taken together with the complementary definitions for “State, United States and citizen” found at § 3121(e), “American vessel and aircraft” found at § 3121(f), “American employer” found at § 3121(h), and “International agreements” found at 42 U.S.C. § 433.
Discussion of the Issue
2.  Congress has imposed the tax codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 with respect to items of statutory income, not non-statutory income. These items of statutory income are specifically defined throughout the Internal Revenue Code. The general definition for “gross income” found at § 61(a) is limited in scope by complementary statutory definitions that specifically define each specific item of statutory income. In this case, the items of income at issue are defined in section § 3121.
3.  “Wages” is defined twice in the Internal Revenue Code, once at § 3121(a), and again at § 3401(a). The definitions in § 3121 correspond to the tax imposed at § 3101, and the definitions in § 3401 correspond to the federal withholding provisions imposed at § 3402. The “wages” defined at § 3121(a) are those received through “employment” as defined at § 3121(b), taken together with the complementary definitions in § 3121 and 42 U.S.C. § 433. The “wages” defined at § 3401(a) are those received by the “employee” defined at § 3401(c). A review of these definitions shows that the definitions found in § 3401 are a subset of the definitions found in § 3121. Read the definition for “employee” at § 3401(c), and then read the definition for “American employer” at § 3121(h). The definition for “American employer” at § 3121(h) encompasses the employment of the “employee” defined at § 3401(c).
4.  Because the definition for “wages” at § 3401(a) is a subset of the definition for “wages” at § 3121(a), the definitions in § 3121 control the proper accounting of “wages, salaries, tips, etc.” on the face of the IRS Form 1040.
5.  The definitions in § 3121 also control the proper accounting of “self-employment income” on the face of the IRS Form 1040. This is because the definitions in § 1402 corresponding to “self-employment income” including the definition for “employee and wages” also point to the tax imposed at § 3101 and to the definitions in § 3121.
6.  In accordance with the basic principles of Constitutional taxation, “employment” as defined at § 3121(b) is the subject of the tax, and “all remuneration” from “employment” is the measure of the tax.
7.  The purpose of § 3401 is merely to provide definitions corresponding to the federal withholding provisions found in § 3402. Section 3401 does not define “employment”, which is the subject of the tax, because it is already defined in § 3121.

Randall White
(561) 743-6945
randallewhite@me.com
Paralegal Service
6119 Mullin Street
Jupiter, FL 33458





- - - - -  Estoppel Letter 1.8 to Commissioner of Internal Revenue - - - - -
John Doe
123 Anywhere Street
Anytown, CA 12345-6789
March 3, 2011
Certified Mail No. 7007 0220 0003 9592 xxxx
Douglas H. Shulman
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20224
Re: Statutory construction and the meaning of legislative enactments

Dear Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
In order that I can be informed of all information necessary for me to complete my own self-assessment to determine the sums due and owing to the United States Treasury, please provide me with a legal opinion in re the statutory construction of the following legislative enactments and questions about the rules of statutory construction:
  1. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(e)(1) defines (for the purposes of Chapter 21, Federal Insurance Contributions Act) "State" as the general class of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa? See Helvering v. Morgan's, 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1, 55 S. Ct. 60, 61 n.1, 79 L. Ed. 232 (1934).
  2. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(e)(2) defines (for the purposes of Chapter 21, Federal Insurance Contributions Act) "United States" when used in a geographical sense as the general class of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa? See Helvering v. Morgan's, 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1, 55 S. Ct. 60, 61 n.1, 79 L. Ed. 232 (1934).
  3. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(A)(i) taken together with the complementary definitions for "State, United States and citizen" found at § 3121(e) define "employment" "(i) within the United States" to mean performing service by an employee for the employer within the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa?
  4. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(A)(ii) taken together with the complementary definitions for "State, United States and citizen" found at § 3121(e), and "American vessel and aircraft" found at § 3121(f), define "employment" "(ii) on or in connection with an American vessel or American aircraft under a contract of service which is entered into within the United States or during the performance of which and while the employee is employed on the vessel or aircraft it touches at a port in the United States, if the employee is employed on and in connection with such vessel or aircraft when outside the United States, to mean performing service by an employee for the employer on or in connection with an American vessel or American aircraft under a contract of service entered into within the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa, or touching at a port in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa?
  5. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(B) taken together with the complementary definitions for "State, United States and citizen" found at § 3121(e), and "American employer" found at § 3121(h), define "employment" "(B) outside the United States by a citizen or resident of the United States as an employee for an American employer (as defined in subsection (h))" to mean performing service for the United States or any instrumentality thereof, including for any individual or entity subject to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa?
  6. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(C) taken together with the complementary definition for "International agreements" found at 42 U.S.C. § 433 define "employment" "(C) if it is service, regardless of where or by whom performed, which is designated as employment or recognized as equivalent to employment under an agreement entered into under section 233 of the Social Security Act;" to mean working under an international social security old-age, survivors, disability, or derivative benefits agreement?
  7. It is true, is it not, that the regulation published by Congress in the Federal Register at 8 FR 12267, § 404.104 for the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) defines (for the purposes of Chapter 24, Collection of income tax at source on wages) "employee" as the general class of "officers and employees whether elected or appointed, of the United States, a State, Territory, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing"? See Helvering v. Morgan's, 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1, 55 S. Ct. 60, 61 n.1, 79 L. Ed. 232 (1934).
  8. It is true, is it not, that the purpose of providing a statutory definition is to supersede, not enlarge, the common or ordinary dictionary definition of a word? See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 2615 (2000) ("When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning. Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 484-485 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. at 392-393, n. 10 ("As a rule, `a definition which declares what a term "means" ... excludes any meaning that is not stated' "); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490, 502 (1945) ("Of course, statutory definitions of terms used therein prevail over colloquial meanings."); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 95-96, 55 S.Ct. 333, 336 (1935) ("[A] definition by the average man or even by the ordinary dictionary with its studied enumeration of subtle shades of meaning is not a substitute for the definition set before us by the lawmakers with instructions to apply it to the exclusion of all others."); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases)."); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 119 S. Ct. 755, 760 (1999) ("This Court's review -- begins with the statute's language."); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475 (1992) ("In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 190 (1991)."); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2172 (1989) ("The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language."); BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004) ("The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to "presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992). Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous. -- Connecticut Nat. Bank, supra, at 254.").
  9. It is true, is it not, that the taxing statutes are strictly construed? See United States v. Stone & Downer, 47 S. Ct. 616, 274 U.S. 225 (1927) ("The rule against enlarging the subject-matter of a statute by judicial interpretation has been applied with great particularity in the case of statutes levying taxes"); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 78 L Ed 2d 17, 104 S Ct. 296 (1983) (""[Where] Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)."); Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153, 38 S.Ct. 53 (1917) ("In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen."); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases).
  10. It is true, is it not, that when the verb "means" is used in an Internal Revenue Code definition, the term and its definition are to be interchangeable equivalents; and when the verb "includes" is used in an Internal Revenue Code definition, the definition imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition? See Helvering v. Morgan's, 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1, 55 S. Ct. 60, 61 n.1, 79 L. Ed. 232 (1934), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court explained the meaning of the verbs "means" and "includes" in the context of the Revenue Act of 1926, as follows:
*fn1 The terms 'means' and 'includes' are not necessarily synonymous. The distinction in their use is aptly pointed by sections 2, 200 of the act itself (26 USCA 1262, 931). Section 2(a) of the act (see 26 USCA 1262(a) and note) gives general definitions of ten terms; of these, three are stated to 'include' designated particular instances, the other seven are stated to 'mean' the definitions subsequently given. Section 200, in addition to the definitions contained in subsection (a), gives four of which two use the verb 'include' and two the verb 'means.' That the draftsman used these words in a different sense seems clear. The natural distinction would be that where 'means' is employed, the term and its definition are to be interchangeable equivalents, and that the verb 'includes' imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition. This view finds support in section 2(b) of the act (26 USCA 1262(b), which reads: 'The terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.'
Note: The definition for "includes" at Section 2(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926 cited by the Court in Helvering v. Morgan's [formerly codified at 26 USCA 1262(b) in the footnote] is now codified word-for-word the same at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c).
  1. It is true, is it not, that the principle that "includes" is "not limiting" in the context of an Internal Revenue Code definition does not diminish the principle established in Helvering v. Morgan's that when the verb "includes" is used in an Internal Revenue Code definition, the definition imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition? See Brigham v. United States, 160 F.3d 759 (1st Cir. 1998) ("but "includes" is not limiting. Rather, "[t]he terms 'includes' and 'including' . . . shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c). In light of this we apply the principle that a list of terms should be construed to include by implication those additional terms of like kind and class as the expressly included terms. *fn2 This follows from the canon noscitur a sociis, "a word is known by the company it keeps." Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708-09 (1878)"). The principle that "includes" is "not limiting", the principle that "includes" imports a general class, and the interpretive canon noscitur a sociis are all complementary and harmonious.
  2. It is true, is it not, that the Sixteenth Amendment did not repeal or modify Article I and that the Amendment does not have any enactment clause or implementing regulations or budget for implementation, thus the Amendment is merely a philosophical statement made with the object of maintaining the limitations of the Constitution and harmonizing their operation, and that the Amendment does not attempt to do that which, under the Constitution, Congress cannot do? See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12-19, 36 S. Ct. 236 (1916) ("[T]he contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax -- thus destroying the two great classifications [of direct and indirect taxation under the Constitution] is -- wholly without foundation."); and Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1916), ("[B]y the previous ruling [Brushaber] it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged.")
  3. It is true, is it not, that the Sixteenth Amendment must be read in light of the United States Constitution, including Article I, Section 9, clause 4, which states, "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken"? See Wright v. United States, 58 S. Ct. 395, 302 U.S. 583, 607 (1938) ("The Court has hitherto consistently held that a literal reading of a provision of the Constitution which defeats a purpose evident when the instrument is read as a whole, is not to be favored. -- "From whatever source derived," as it is written in the Sixteenth Amendment, does not mean from whatever source derived. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245.")
  4. It is true, is it not, that because the United States Supreme Court has mandated through case law precedent interpreting the language of the 16th Amendment in the context of the Constitution, including Article I, Section 9, clause 4, it is therefore proper to interpret the substantially similar language in the definition for "gross income" at 26 U.S.C. § 61 in the context of Article I, Section 9, clause 4?
  5. It is true, is it not, that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court case law precedent cited above, all taxes imposed in the Internal Revenue Code, including the taxes on "employment" measured by "self-employment income" or "net earnings from self-employment" or "wages", are limited under the Constitution to the class of indirect taxes in the nature of an excise?
  6. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definitions corresponding to the taxes imposed in the Internal Revenue Code, including all of those definitions corresponding to the legal requirements for listing "gross income" on the face of an IRS Form 1040, must be strictly construed in conformity with the principle of indirect taxation on the earnings of the individual, so as not to run afoul of the Constitution?
  7. It is true, is it not, that all Treasury regulations interpreting the meaning of statutory definitions must conform to United States Supreme Court case law precedent on statutory construction, and that any interpretation of a statutory definition by the Treasury which does not conform to United States Supreme Court case law precedent on statutory construction is null and void?
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 90 days from the verifiable receipt of this information your silence shall be deemed to verify that the foregoing statements are true in law and you will be deemed estopped by your obligation to adhere to the United States Supreme Court mandated case law precedent on statutory construction from inferring any other meaning to these statutes.
Your silence will be deemed estoppel from inferring any other meaning to these statutes.
This information will be released into the public domain and will be used in any situation deemed lawful.
Respectfully submitted,


John Doe

Copy to:
John A. DiCicco
Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

NOTES:
  • Get your zip plus four U.S. postal mailing code because you will need it to obtain the name and mailing address for your State Representative in Congress for the purpose of sending a copy of this letter to him or her. To look up your zip plus four code go to:
  • Then find your Representative's name and mailing address at:
  • Also send a copy to your State Senators in Congress. Find their names and mailing addresses at:
  • After 90 days lapses, or sooner if the Commissioner responds to your inquiry, and depending on how he responds, if he responds, there will be an appropriate follow-up letter template provided for your next step in establishing estoppel against IRS frivolous arguments.


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1 comment:

Violaman said...

Has Randy received a reply yet?