Spank the IRS for Operations Outside Their Zone - 4 USC 72

Bob Hurt Plays IRS Boogie

I have attached a 4 USC 72 brief to help combat IRS operations in territories Congress did not authorize the IRS to operate in,

Chris Chapman presented this argument in the Federal Grand Jury investigation into his income tax obligations.  The Middle District of Florida USDC in Orlando, Chief Judge Fawcette had a smartass magistrate call him in to justify not paying income tax on the CO2 Chris exudes.  The Magistrate quoted the 16^th Amendent to Chris and said “it seems pretty clear to me” that you owe tax.

Later Chris got called into the Grand Jury.  They wanted to hose him the way they did Marcel Roy Bendshadler, Cajun Mike, etc.  Chris hammered them to explain how the IRS has the right to mess with him down in the middle bowel of the State of Florida, given that Congress did not permit them to exercise the office in Florida as required by 4 USC 72. They never answered.

Chris sailed out of the Grand Jury’s presence and he hasn’t heard from the IRS on that matter since.

Will this work for you?

DEMAND to go before the Grand Jury, and ARGUE this matter with them.  Maybe the IRS will leave you alone too.

See the brief attached and below

https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/ChallJurisdiction/BriefRegardingSecretary-4usc72.pdf

Bob Hurt 2460 Persian Drive #70 - Clearwater, FL 33763 +1 (727) 669-5511 Donate to my Law Scholarship Fund Learn civil litigation with Jurisdictionary Subscribe to Lawmen Newsletter FREE Download Fi l es FREE from the Lawmen Archive

Brief Regarding 4 USC § 72 and
The Secretary’s Authority in the Several States

1. 4 U.S.C. § 72, which is positive law, mandates that all offices of government are restricted to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” unless Congress “expressly” extends their granted authority to other geographical areas by United States law.

“All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District  of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.” 4 U.S.C. § 72 (Emphasis added).

2. United States law 4 U.S.C. § 72 provides the litmus test for the jurisdiction of every office attached to the seat of government; which includes the Secretary and his alleged Delegates.

3. 4 U.S.C. § 72 is concerned with the venue or “WHERE” offices of the United States can exercise their authority and not WHAT said offices can do. The breakdown of this law is as follows:

a.              ALL offices attached to the seat of government are contemplated in this law and not just some offices – this includes the Secretary, the IRS and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), etc.;

b.             The provisions of 4 U.S.C. § 72 are mandatory by the use of the word “shall” by Congress. In other words, this is not an optional consideration for any United States officer, Court or Agency;

c.               The “exercise” of ALL government offices is by default limited to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” This means that “the District of Columbia” is the starting place for jurisdiction not the exception;

d.             An exception can be made to said limitations of ALL offices to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” As set forth in 4 U.S.C. § 72, authority to act outside “the District of Columbia” must be “otherwise expressly provided by law.” This means that if Congress intends to extend the authority of a particular office of the United States to areas outside “the District of Columbia,” it shall “expressly” delegate, grant and extend said authority in United States law; and

e.               Any “expressly” delegated exception to the limitations of an officer’s authority to that of “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” is to be authorized by Congress in “law.” Since Congress (Legislative Branch) has the exclusive authority to create law for the United States (District of Columbia) and the territories and insular possessions, exceptions to the mandate of 4 USC § 72 shall be found only in United States law and not in Codes of Regulations or presidential executive orders (Executive Branch) or in Supreme Court rulings (Judicial Branch). Only Congress by United States law can authorize, grant or extend the authority of any government office outside “the District of Columbia,” pursuant to 4 U.S.C. § 72.

4. The Supreme Court agrees:

“Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of the grant. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress.” Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 (1931)(Emphasis added)

5.      One of the key words in 4 U.S.C. § 72 is the word “expressly.” This means that when Congress extends the authority of any office or officer of the United States outside “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere,” Congress will do it by “expressly” extending the Secretary’s authority and by leaving no doubt that said authority has been “expressly” extended by Congress to a particular geographical area outside “the District of Columbia.” The definition of “expressly” from Black’s Law Dictionary, 6^th Ed. is as follows:

“In an express manner; in direct and unmistakable terms; explicitly; definitely;

directly. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W.2d. 685, 689. The opposite of impliedly. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d. 381, 396.” (Emphasis added)

6.      Any exception to the limitations of 4 USC § 72 is to be authorized “expressly” by Congress in United States “law”. The Courts are not empowered to extend the authority of the Secretary to any other place other than “the District of Columbia” (see case cited in ¶ 20.c herein).

7.      What follows are examples of United States by which Congress has “expressly” extended the Secretary’s authority outside “the District of Columbia:”

a.       48 USC § 1612(a) is cited herein as follows:

Jurisdiction. The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States, including, but not limited to, the diversity jurisdiction provided for in section 1332 of title 28, United States Code, and that of a bankruptcy court of the United States. The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal and civil proceedings in the Virgin Islands with respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands, regardless of the degree of the offense or of the amount involved, except the ancillary laws relating to the income tax enacted by the legislature of the Virgin Islands. Any act or failure to act with respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands which would constitute a criminal offense described in chapter 75 of subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 USCS § § 7201 et seq.] shall constitute an offense against the government of the Virgin Islands and may be prosecuted in the name of the government of the Virgin Islands by the appropriate officers thereof in the District Court of the Virgin Islands without the request or consent of the United States attorney for the Virgin Islands, notwithstanding the provisions of section 27 of this Act [48 USCS § 1617]. (Emphasis added)

and

b.      48 USC § 1397. Income tax laws of United States in force; payment of proceeds; levy of surtax on all taxpayers

The income-tax laws in force in the United States of America and those which may hereafter be enacted shall be held to be likewise in force in the

Virgin Islands of the United States, except that the proceeds of such taxes shall be paid into the treasuries of said islands: Provided further, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Legislature of the Virgin Islands is authorized to levy a surtax on all taxpayers in an amount not to exceed 10 per centum of their annual income tax obligation to the government of the Virgin Islands.

c.       48 USC § 1421i. Income tax Applicability of Federal laws; separate tax

The income-tax laws in force in the United States of America and those which may hereafter be enacted shall be held to be likewise in force in Guam: Provided, That notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Legislature of Guam may levy a separate tax on all taxpayers in an amount not to exceed 10 per centum of their annual income tax obligation to the Government of Guam.

d.      48 SC § 1801. Approval of Covenant to Establish Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands That the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, the text of which is as follows [note to this section], is hereby approved.

e.                                                                                                     the Covenant which was approved by Congress states in part: “Article VI

“revenue and taxation

“Section 601. (a) The income tax laws in force in the United States will come into force in the Northern Mariana Islands as a local territorial income tax on the first day of January following the effective date of this Section, in the same manner as those laws are in force in Guam.”

Under the NOTES under References in Text it states:

“The income-tax laws in force in the United States of America, referred to in text, are classified to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.”

8. In 55 Stat. 685, the War Department (later renamed to Department of Defense (“DOD”)) was “expressly” authorized by Congress to enter Arlington Country, Virginia and occupy an office building on land which had already been designated and approved for the Department of Agriculture. This shows conclusively that even when the federal government has “expressly” authorized one office of the government to operate and function outside the District of Columbia and within one of the several 50 union states (“several states”) (Virginia) pursuant to 4 USC § 72, another office of the government seeking to operate in the same area outside the

District of Columbia, obtains the “expressly” granted authority by Congress for that specific office to operate in said specific geographical area outside the District of Columbia.

9.              Unless Congress through United States law “expressly” grants to the Secretary the authority to Act outside “the District of Columbia” (the “WHERE”), any non-specific and general authority dealing with “WHO” has authority or “WHAT” authority is given to a particular office attached to the seat of government is to be construed as limited to and restricted to “the District of Columbia, and NOT ELSEWHERE,” pursuant to 4 USC § 72.

10.       Over 40 U.S. Attorneys have been unable to find and submit into evidence any such United States law by which Congress “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary to the several states ¹ in like manner as Congress has so “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands; soil over which Congress has “exclusive” legislative jurisdiction in contradistinction to the several states; soil over which Congress has “limited” and NOT “exclusive” legislative jurisdiction.

11.       In addition to the mandates of 4 USC § 72, Congress has also enacted United States law which restricts the delegates of the Secretary and the Commissioner from leaving “the District of Columbia” and entering the several states without designated authority from the Secretary and the Commissioner. In 1994, 26 USC § 7803(b)(1) stated in part the following:

“(b) Appointment and supervision “(1) Designation of Post of Duty

“The Secretary shall determine and designate the posts of duty of all such persons engaged in field work or traveling on official business outside the  District of Columbia.” ' (Emphasis added)

12.       The current rendition of the same law is now found in 26 USC § 7804(b)(1) and reads as follows:

“(b) Posts of duty of employees in field service or traveling “Unless otherwise prescribed by the Secretary—

“(1) Designation of post of duty

¹ Of Course, if said law did exist, why wouldn’t the Courts and U.S. Attorneys simply just present said law for all to see? What could be simpler? However, at least 40 U.S. Attorney’s have been asked to present said authority and not one has been able to bring forward any said “expressly” delegated authority in United States law. Instead, they have claimed that claims based on 4 USC § 72 are frivolous without themselves offering any law in support of the notion that said jurisdiction claims are in fact frivolous or as in the case of Walden v. U.S., #A-05-CA-444-LY, U.S. District Court, Austin, TX, the Court issues a protective order so the United States does not have to expose the  Material Fact that Congress has not so “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the several 50 union states. Courts which simply declare that the IRS or the Secretary can exercise their authority without at the same time substantiating said declaration with an “expressly” extended authority granted by Congress in United States law is nothing more than an opinion and bears no weight when deciphering United States law 4 USC § 72 and determining if the Secretary has jurisdiction in the several states pursuant thereto.

² Said field service personnel which have been so designated outside the District of Columbia by the Secretary or the Commissioner can be designated to work inside the District of Columbia and then Reassigned, by delegation of authority, to a designated post of duty back outside the District of Columbia after their work is done (See 26 USC § 7803(b)(1) (1994) (re-codified as 26 USC § 7804(b)(1)).

“The Commissioner shall determine and designate the posts of duty of all such persons engaged in field work or traveling on official business outside of the  District of Columbia.” ² (Emphasis added)

13.       To confirm whether the Secretary, the Commissioner or their delegate IRS Agents have the authority to administer and enforce internal revenue laws within the several states, where is the delegation of authority from the Secretary to the Commissioner or other alleged delegates which “designate” that IRS agents or delegates acting on behalf of the Secretary have a “post of duty” in geographical areas “outside the District of Columbia” and within the several states for the purpose of conducting “official business” pursuant to 26 USC § 7803(b)(1) (1994) (re-codified as 26 USC § 7804(b)(1)) and 4 USC § 72? Since over 40 U.S. Attorneys cannot produce said law or said delegation of authority, it can only be concluded that no such delegation of authority exists in United States law. For this reason, no designation has been published in the federal register thereby giving notice to Citizens in the several states of the extended powers of the Secretary and his delegates. If no such United States law exists, then the Secretary has no authority “expressly” granted to him by Congress which he can exercise with the several states.

14.       This should remove all doubt and should confirm to the reader that Congress does in fact “expressly” extend the authority of the Secretary to other locations outside “the District of Columbia” in United States law when it intends to do so. In fact, if Congress follows the mandates of 4 USC § 72 with regard to the Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands— territories or insular possessions of the United States over which it has exclusive legislative authority—why shouldn’t Congress also follow the mandates of 4 USC § 72 with respect to the several states—areas over which it does NOT have exclusive legislative jurisdiction? There is no legal argument or basis in law by which one can sustain the contention that Congress follows the mandates of 4 USC § 72 in territories or insular possessions of the United States over which it has a greater “exclusive” legislative authority and Congress ignores the mandates of 4 USC § 72 in areas such as the several states over which Congress has only a lesser “limited” legislative or constitutional authority.

15.       It has been long established by the Courts that in personam and subject-matter jurisdiction are paramount to an Agencies authority to act. The following ruling demonstrates that it is not frivolous for one to demand, from an Agent acting on behalf of the Secretary, what Act of Congress “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary outside “the District of Columbia” to the several states pursuant to 4 USC § 72:

“The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the States, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government.” Caha v. United States, 152 US 211 (Emphasis added)

16.       The location of “United States”, as defined by law, further confirms that the authority of the Secretary is restricted to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” The Uniform Commercial Code at § 9-307(h) states:

“(h) The United States is located in the District of Columbia.”

17.       This exact provision is reflected in various state codes, including, but not limited to California and Texas. 3

18.       Unless the Secretary or his delegates (IRS) as a complaining party in any action can establish that Congress has “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary outside “the District of Columbia” to the several states, any Actions of any employee of the United States and delegate of the Secretary are null and void:

“Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of administrative agencies [i.e., referrals to the DOJ] and where jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied, the action of the agency is a nullity...” City Street Improv Co. v. Pearson, 181 C 640, 185 P. (1962); O’Neil v. Dept. of Professional & Vocational Standards, 7 CA2d 3 93, 46 P2d

234 (Emphasis added)

19.       There is no law to rebut the facts and law as presented herein relative to 4 USC § 72. It is required that jurisdiction appear on the record pursuant to 4 USC § 72. Failure to do so is a denial of Petitioner’s rights to due process:

“The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 US 533.

20.       No one should not be deceived by the smoke and mirror tactics of U.S. Attorney’s. Non-responsive answers to inquiries to date. Some of these non-responsive answers are as follows:

a. Treasury Order 150-10 (See ¶ 26) extends the Secretary’s authority to the Commissioner.

i.                  This Treasury Order does not address the “expressly” delegated authority of the Secretary;

ii.               Furthermore, this is a general delegation of authority which addresses “WHAT” the Commissioner can do and does not address “WHERE” the Commissioner can exercise the Secretary’s authority pursuant to 4 USC § 72;

iii.            Nothing in TDO 150-10 “expressly” extends the authority of the Commissioner to the several states;

iv.           Furthermore, this Treasury Order has not been published in the Federal Register, pursuant to 44 USC § 1505 and 5 USC § 553 and therefore it is not applicable to the Citizens in the several states. The Secretary admits this by his ruling in 1953,⁴ where he requires all divisions or units of the IRS to publish in the Federal Register any item of concern to the American public. This was even more clearly stated in 1955 ⁵ as follows:

“It shall be the policy to publish for public information all statements of practices and procedure issued primarily for internal

³ See California Commercial Code § 9307(h) and Texas Business & Commerce Code § 9.307(h).

⁴ Revenue Ruling 2 (1953-1 CB 484).

⁵ Rev Procd. 55-1 (1955-2 CB 897)

use, and, hence, appearing in internal management documents, which affect rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes.”

v.              Since TDO 150-10 has not been published in the Federal Register, it is not applicable to Citizens in the several states; and

vi.           Therefore, citing TDO 150-10 is non-responsive to the mandates of 4 USC § 72.

b. U.S. Attorneys have recently begun citing Hughes v. U.S., 953 F.2d 531, 542- 43 (9th Cir. 199 1) in response to the jurisdictional challenges regarding the Secretary. The Hughes ruling claims that “4 USC § 72 does not foreclose the authority of the IRS outside the District of Columbia.” The only reason given by the Hughes Court is that the President in 26 USC § 7621 is authorized to establish internal revenue districts outside Washington, D.C.⁶ This argument fails every aspect of the 4 USC § 72 litmus test as follows:

i.                  Establishing internal revenue districts outside Washington, D.C. does not have the same effect in law as establishing internal revenue districts within the several states; especially in light of 4 USC § 72. It has been cited herein that the Secretary can indeed leave Washington, D.C. and enter The Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Marianas (to name three other geographical locations) The issue is can he enter the several states?;

ii.               4 USC § 72 mandates that ALL offices associated with the government that have jurisdiction within the several states shall be “expressly” authorized by Congress to act within the several states in United States law. Authorizing the office of President in 26 USC § 7621 does not “expressly” authorize the office of Secretary when the Secretary is not even mentioned;

iii.            The term ALL OFFICES, whether defined or not, includes all offices associated with the seat of government. If this refers to buildings, then ALL BUILDINGS are to be in “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” unless Congress “expressly” provides otherwise in United States law. It is unlikely that Congress intended that the term “offices” would refer to buildings since buildings cannot exercise any authority at all; only people can exercise authority and it is the authority of said offices which must be “exercised” within only “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere”;

iv.           With few exceptions, it is the Secretary who is authorized by Congress to write all needful rules and regulations for the administration and enforcement of Title 26 (See 26 USC §§ 7801, 7805). Therefore it is that Office which must acquire express leave by Congress to act within

⁶ Congress has “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the Virgin Islands with respect to 26 USC Chapter 75 and this area is obviously outside “the District of Columbia” but not remotely associated with the several states.

the several states not that of the President. The Hughes Court implies in error that 26 USC § 7621 is the “expressly” stated grant of leave issued by Congress as required under 4 USC § 72, claiming that the office of the President of the U.S. is somehow the same office as that occupied by the Secretary.

v.              The term “State” as used in 26 USC § 7621 includes “the District of Columbia” (see 26 USC § 7701(a)(10))⁷. Even if “State” could be concluded to include the several states, this definition does not “expressly” extend the office of Secretary to the several states when the several states are not “expressly” mentioned in the meaning of “State” as used in § 7621 (see § 7701(a)(10)). A “definition” is a limitation upon the term defined and it excludes what is not specifically included (See any dictionary or Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition). Without rebuttal to the contrary, Congress has limited the Secretary’s authority to “the District of Columbia,” the Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Marianas (see ¶¶ 7 supra), never having “expressly” granted the Secretary the statutory leave to exercise his authority in the several states.

vi.           Moreover, there is no evidence in the Hughes case or in any other case to establish the material fact that the President has established said internal revenue districts⁸ in the several states⁹? However, there is evidence that the President established “customs districts,” but no internal revenue districts have ever been established by the President within the several states. ¹⁰ If one argues that the President has authorized the Secretary to create internal revenue districts, then what

⁷ Under this definition, Alaska and Hawaii were removed from applicability upon receiving freely associated compact state status (See P.L. 86-624, § 18(j); P.L. 86-70, § 22(a)). The several states are “countries” (See 28 USC § 297(b)).

⁸ The Hughes Court implies that the President’s (Secretary’s alleged “implied”) authority outside Washington, D.C. pursuant to 26 USC § 7621 somehow means that the Secretary’s authority has been “expressly” extended to the several states when in fact all the Court said was that the IRS can act outside of Washington, D.C. Congress has indeed extended the Secretary’s authority (and presumably the IRS) to areas outside “the District of Columbia” but the several states is not one of those areas. As a result of this misleading description of the IRS (Secretary’s) authority, the Courts continue to promulgate the error that Hughes extends the authority of the IRS to the several states which violates the letter and spirit of 4 USC § 72. To date, no Court or U.S. Attorney has identified one U.S. law by which Congress has “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the several states thereby forcing American Citizens to speculate that no said authority has been established by Congress for the Secretary in the several states.

⁹ In 1998, via Executive Order (“E.O.”) #10289, as amended, President William J. Clinton authorized the Secretary to establish revenue districts under authority of 26 USC § 7621. Although § 7621 is not listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, E.O. #10289 is listed. The implementing regulations for said Executive Order are found in 19 CFR Part 101. Said regulation establishes “customs collection offices” in each of the several states; it does not establish “internal revenue districts”. A note at 26 CFR § 301.7621-1 confirms that E.O. #10289 is the only authority for establishing revenue districts.

¹⁰ The burden of proof that said districts have been established by the President within the several states is upon the Court and U.S. Attorneys if they hope to establish jurisdiction on the record. Without said evidence in the record, Respondent and the Courts cannot assume that said districts exist and therefore cannot assume that Secretary has any authority in the several states.

evidence can be entered into the record to show that the Secretary has by treasury order or regulation, created said internal revenue districts within the several states?

vii. If no internal revenue districts have been established in the several states by the President or even by the Secretary, then out of which internal revenue districts allegedly established by the President within the several states does the Secretary administer and enforce internal revenue laws?

c. Several Court rulings have stated that the IRS can exercise its authority outside the District of Columbia.

i.                  Every case cited to date by any U.S. Attorney is off-point. 4 USC § 72 states that any “expressly” granted exception to the limitations of “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” as mandated, are to be found in United States law and NOT the Courts.

“Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of the grant. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress.” Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 (1931)(Emphasis added)

ii.               Generally, all cases cited to date have dealt with WHAT the Secretary can do and not WHERE he can do it. 4 USC § 72 is about the geographical location or WHERE the Secretary can exercise his authority and nothing else.

iii.            Unless one can present the law which so “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary to the several states, said offices can only exercise their authority within the geographical areas “expressly” authorized by Congress in law (See ¶ 7 supra); and

iv.           Therefore citing court rulings is a non-responsive answer.

d. Judges have recently attempted to protect U.S. Attorneys and the government by stating on the record and in orders that the Citizen is arguing that the Secretary cannot leave “the District of Columbia.” Any argument to this effect is a falsification of the record. The contention has always been that he is restricted from ENTERING the several states unless Congress has “expressly” authorized him to do so in United States law. No law, No Authority!

21.                                                        The Courts, U.S. Attorneys, the Secretary, the Commissioner and the IRS have a

duty to address the issue of jurisdiction as cited herein. Neither the Courts nor the Secretary and his delegates can enforce internal revenue laws within the several states without the Secretary having a clear and “expressly” granted authority to exercise his authority within the several states. To do so would be a denial of Petitioner’s rights to due process and his/her right to the protections afforded by United States law—4 USC § 72 and 26 USC § 7803(b)(1) (1994) (re-codified as 26 USC § 7804(b)(1)—to not be bothered by the government (See 18 USC § 242) and if said right is denied or ignored by more than two officers of the United States, said denial constitutes a denial of Petitioner’s rights pursuant to 18 USC § 241.

22.                               There simply is no “expressly”, “unmistakable” and “explicitly” (see definition of “Expressly” in ¶ 4 supra) Act of Congress by which Congress has “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary or that of his alleged Delegates to administer and enforce internal revenue law outside “the District of Columbia” and within the several states with regard to the personal income tax and withholding related thereto.

23.                               Moreover, the offices associated with the seat of government are foreign to the several states and this is precisely why the jurisdiction of the United States is restricted to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.”

"The United States Government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state." Volume 20: Corpus Juris Secundum, (P 1785: NY re: Merriam 36 N.E. 505 1441 S.Ct. 1973, 41 L. Ed. 287)

24.                               The United States Supreme Court removes all doubt by stating this fact in no uncertain terms:

"The laws of Congress...do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the national government." Caha v United States, 152 US, at 215 (Emphasis added)

25.                               It is not unreasonable to demand said “expressly” delegated authority in light of the following Treasury Department/Delegation Orders (TDO) by which the Secretary “expressly” authorized the Commissioner the authority to ACT in certain areas outside “the District of Columbia”:

a.               The Commissioner's authority was published in the Federal Register via Treasury Department Order (TDO) 150-42 dated July 27, 1956, 21 Fed. Reg. 5852. It delegated to the Commissioner the following authority:

“The Commissioner shall, to the extent of authority vested in him, provide for the administration of the United States Internal Revenue

laws in the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico and the Virgin  Islands. ”(Emphasis added)

b.              TDO 150-105 of January 24, 1985, Designation of Internal Revenue Districts states at paragraph 4, U.S. Territories and insular possessions:

“The Commissioner Internal Revenue Service shall, to the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide for the administration of the United States Internal Revenue laws in the U.S. territories and insular  possessions and other authorized areas of the world. [areas authorized by other delegations of authority]” ¹¹(Emphasis added)

c.               TDO 150-104 of January 24, 1985, Designation of Internal Regions and Regional Service Centers, at paragraph 4. U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions:

“The Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service shall, to the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide for the administration of the United States Internal Revenue laws in the U.S. Territories and insular

¹¹ TDO 150-105 of 1/24/85 was superseded by TDO 150-1 2/27/86.

possessions and other authorized areas of the world.” (Emphasis added)

d.             Then, in February 27, 1986, the Secretary delegated additional authority to the Commissioner in TDO 150-01 51 Fed. Reg. 9571 on Page 9573, it states:

“...the Commissioner shall, to the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide for the administration of the United States Internal Revenue laws in the "U.S. Territories and insular possessions and other authorized areas of the world.” (Emphasis added)

e.               TDO 150-01 dated October 27, 1987 at Paragraph 5: U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions" is identical to TDO 150-01 of Feb. 27, 1986.

f.                TDO 150-01 dated September 28, 1995, at Paragraph 3. U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions" is identical to TDO 150-01 of October 27, 1987.

“The Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall, to the extent of authority vested in the Commissioner, provide for the administration of the United States internal revenue laws in the U.S. territories and insular possessions and other areas of the world.” (Emphasis added)

26.                               In TDO 150-10 the Secretary delegates his authority to the Commissioner as follows:

“1. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall be responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Internal Revenue laws.”

27.                               Given the fact that TDO 150-10 seems to now give the Commissioner authority to administer and enforce internal revenue law without any geographical limitations, it must be noted that the cancellation of TDO 150-01 by TDO 150-02 decommissioned the districts in the several states and located the 13 offices created by TDO 150-02 within the District of Columbia. In short, when districts existed within the several states, the Commissioner was authorized by the Secretary to act only outside the District of Columbia and within the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico the Virgin Islands, U.S. territories and insular possessions; not within the several states. When the districts are decommissioned in the several states, the commissioner is given authority to act seemingly without any geographic limitations. By this action, one can only conclude that 4 USC § 72 now becomes the limiting factor since Congress has not “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the several states, and the Secretary therefore can only extend his authority granted by Congress to the Commissioner and other delegates in TDO 150-10 to the same geographical areas in which Congress has authorized the Secretary to enter (i.e., the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Marianas pursuant to 4 USC § 72, 48 USC §§ 1612(a), 1397, 1421i, 1801 (citing Northern Marianas Covenant § 601), respectively). ¹²

28.                               Since the Secretary on previous occasions has “expressly” granted authority to the Commissioner, in accordance with the mandates of 4 U.S.C. § 72, in specific areas outside “the District of Columbia” — namely “Panama Canal Zone”, “Puerto Rico”, “the Virgin Islands” and “U.S. territories and insular possessions” — it is not unreasonable for a Citizen to expect the

¹² There may be other geographical locations so authorized by Congress. However, the several states is not one of those geographical areas; at least 40 U.S. Attorneys have been unable to find said express grant by Congress.

Secretary to follow the same lawful protocol and mandate of 4 U.S.C. § 72 and “expressly” grant the Commissioner the authority to administer and enforce internal revenue law outside “the District of Columbia” to geographical areas which include the several states if he intends to grant said express authority to the Commissioner and his Delegates.

29.                               All one has to do is show one Act of Congress which “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary to the several states and this controversy would be over. What could  be simpler?

30.                               It is criminal, in light of the above, for United States Courts and Agencies NOT to presume that the authority of the Secretary, the Commissioner and the IRS is limited and  restricted to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” unless it can be shown that Congress  has “expressly” extended the of the Secretary in United States law to the several states.

31.                               In the recent confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justices John G. Roberts, Jr. and Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr reiterated numerous times that this country operates under the rule of law and that it is the law and the intent of Congress when it writes said law that dictates the outcome of cases and not the arbitrary decisions of the Court. If this is true, then the rule of law mandates that no office of the government can exercise their authority outside “the District of Columbia”, pursuant to 4 USC § 72, unless Congress “expressly” extends said authority as shown in ¶ 7 supra. Following the rule of law in spite of decades of the People’s misconceptions and the governments misrepresentations and in spite of the consequences resulting from following the law, is what makes United States Courts honorable.

32.                               In footnote 16 of a 1980 case, U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, the court states:

“In another, not unrelated context, Chief Justice Marshall’s exposition in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264 (1821), could well have been the explanation of the Rule of Necessity; he wrote that a court “must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than

to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the  constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.” Id., at 404 (Emphasis added)

33.                               Finally, 4 USC § 73 states:

“In case of the prevalence of a contagious or epidemic disease at the seat of government, the President may permit and direct the removal of any or all the public offices to such other place or places as he shall deem most safe and convenient for conducting the public business.”

34.                               Can one presume that Congress intends to hereby grant the President the authority to remove any or all public offices to places outside the United States (i.e. other countries) or is this a grant by Congress to the President to remove offices of the government from “the District of Columbia” and to exercise said offices within the surrounding several states which have not been affected by said epidemic disease? If a grant for offices attached to the seat of government is not required pursuant to 4 USC § 72 for the several states, then why did Congress make this

grant in 4 USC § 73? Certainly one would not argue that the President was authorized to take our government to another country on another continent?

Questions Relevant to 4 USC § 72

Q1. Does 4 USC § 72 restrict the actions of the Secretary to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” unless Congress “expressly” authorizes the Secretary to act in other specific geographical areas outside “the District of Columbia” over which Congress has jurisdiction?

Q2. Can anyone point to ANY United States law by which Congress has “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to administer and enforce internal revenue laws outside of “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” and within the several states as mandated by Congress in 4 USC § 72?

Q3. If one cannot present any such law, then by what authority do the Secretary and the IRS justify their actions outside “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” and within the several states?

Q4. Does the right to due process embrace or exclude one’s access to the letter of the

law?

The definition of “expressly” from Black’s Law Dictionary, ^6th Ed. is as follows:

“In an express manner; in direct and unmistakable terms; explicitly; definitely; directly. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W.2d. 685, 689. The opposite of impliedly. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d. 381, 396.” (Emphasis added).

Q5. Does 26 USC § 7621 qualify as an “expressly” granted authority to the Secretary to act in areas within the several states or does § 7621 at best present only an “impliedly” granted authority (“the opposite of expressly”)?

Q6. Does 26 USC § 7621 satisfy the following litmus tests of 4 USC § 72:

1.      “All offices” — the Secretary or just the President?

2.      “shall” — is this mandatory or can the Secretary ignore this law?

3.      “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” — is this a restriction to the geographical area of the District of Columbia or not?

4.      “expressly” — does an implied grant of authority to the President meet the “expressly” criteria of 4 USC § 72?

Q7. If one cites Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 542-43 (9^th Cir. 1991) in response to inquiries regarding the jurisdictional authority of the Secretary in the several states, does the wording of 4 USC § 72 support the conclusion of the Hughes Court which claims that “4 USC § 72 does not foreclose [restrict] the authority of the IRS [Secretary] outside the District of Columbia?” Is there anything in the English language that would support the conclusion of the Hughes Court? Especially when the IRS operates under the authority granted by Congress to the Secretary?

Q8. The only reason given by the Hughes Court for their rendition of 4 USC § 72 is that the President is authorized to establish internal revenue districts outside Washington, D.C. Does this argument meet the 4 USC § 72 litmus test?

a.       Is establishing internal revenue districts outside Washington, D.C. the same as “expressly” establishing said districts within the several states; especially in light of 4 USC § 72 when it does not “expressly” authorize where those districts are to be established.

b.      4 USC § 72 mandates that ALL offices be “expressly” authorized by Congress to act within the several states. Does authorizing the office of President “expressly” authorize the office of Secretary when the Secretary is not even mentioned in 26 USC § 7621?

c.       Is the Hughes Court correct when it implies that 26 USC § 7621 “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary to the several states when § 7621 only authorizes the office of the President to act and not the office of the Secretary?

d.      With few exceptions, it is the office of Secretary which is authorized by Congress to write all needful rules and regulations for the administration and enforcement of internal revenue laws (See 26 USC §§ 7801, 7805). Therefore, is it specifically the office of Secretary which must acquire “express” permission from Congress to act within the several states pursuant to 4 USC § 72?

e.       The term “State” as used in 26 USC § 7621 includes ONLY “the District of Columbia” (see 26 USC § 7701(a)(10)) (See Footnote ^7). Even if “State” could be concluded to include the several states by implication only, does this definition “expressly” extend the office of Secretary or does it allegedly extend the office of President and does it “expressly” extend said authority to the several states when the several states are not “expressly” mentioned in the definition of “State” as used in § 7621 (see § 7701(a)(10))?

f.       Has the President indeed established said internal revenue districts in the several states? Is there any evidence that the President established any other tax collection districts besides “customs districts” within the several states? Can one present any Presidential Executive Order by which the President has established internal revenue districts within the several states?

g.      If one argues that the Secretary has been given the authority to create internal revenue districts, can one present any evidence into the record to prove that the Secretary has created internal revenue districts within the several states pursuant to 4 USC § 72, 26 USC § 7621, Executive Order #10289 and/or 26 USC § 7803(b)(1) (1994) (re-codified as 26 USC § 7804(b)(1)?

h.      If one cannot prove that either the President or the Secretary have established internal revenue districts within the several states, out of which non-existent internal revenue districts does the Secretary have the authority to administer and enforce internal revenue laws?

Q9. Explain the following in light of 4 USC § 72:

“It is well established principle of law that all federal legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary intent appears [see 4 USC § 72]” [Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo, 336 US 281 (1948)]

“The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the

territorial limits of the States, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the  national government.” [Caha v. United States, 152 US 211] (Emphasis added).

“Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of the grant [by Congress]. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress.” Federal Trade Commission v.

Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 (1931)(Emphasis added)

Q11.     Does a Citizen have a right to see the law which “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary outside “the District of Columbia” to the several states when he/she asks for said law or is it legally and morally right for the Secretary, several U.S. Attorneys and Courts to be completely silent in response to said questions?

Q12.     When the federal and/or state governments and their agents refuse to show one law that satisfies the mandate of 4 USC § 72, is it a crime for one to be forced to speculate that no law exists, that Congress has not “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the several states and that there is no duty for one to file a return or pay any particular alleged tax allegedly made so by laws which have not been “expressly” extended to the several states?

Q13.     Why does the government refuse to show the law and choose instead to ask the Court for a protective order so they don’t have to reveal the truth about the authority of the Secretary within the several states? ¹³ Wouldn’t it be easier to just show the law?

Q14.     Is it reasonable for one to continue to act upon their understanding of the law until it is dispelled with open discussion and responsive answers from officers of the United States (i.e., the DOJ, the Secretary and the IRS) with logical application of the law to the contrary?

Q15.     How can one avoid prosecution in the future if one believes the conclusions of law which the government cannot disprove?

If the issues raised herein are incorrect with regard to the operation of the law as briefed, the government would have a brief proving said errors and they would not require a protective order to conceal the fact that the Secretary is not “expressly” authorized by Congress to act within the several states. Until there is open discussion and responsive answers from officers of the United States (i.e., Federal Agents or Attorneys) with logical application of the law to the contrary, one cannot do anything other than continue to act upon their understanding of the law as briefed and order one’s life with the understanding that there is no law by which Congress has “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary, the Commissioner and the IRS to the several states pursuant to 4 USC § 72.

¹³ In fact, in the case of Walden v. U.S., #A-05-CA-444-LY, U.S. District Court, Austin, TX, the government asked for a protective order so they did not have to answer the questions relative to 4 USC § 72. Moreover, Walden and others have filed a criminal complaint with over 80 members of Congress regarding said protective order and other issues, including, but not limited to, 4 USC § 72.

Randy White's Estoppel Letter 1.8 - Arrow to the Achilles Heel of the IRS

Please do not try to make the letter into anything more than what it is intended for, which is a means showing good faith in trying to comply with the internal revenue laws and for shutting the DOJ up when it comes time to litigate the merits of one's own self-assessment versus a bogus IRS assessment not conforming to the definitions in IRC section 3121.

The "It is true, is it not," language is from common law, and is used because the Administrative Procedures Act does not authorize any request for admissions.

Authority for request for admissions comes under the civil rules of procedure for discovery, which does not apply under the APA in administrative procedure.

I stay away from the "person" issue because I do not see any remedy in it, no matter how right one may be in their argument. In the context of actually having remedy and good case law, then the "person" argument may get traction. But until then, I see it as another looser. Regarding the meaning of "includes", point 10 of the estoppel letter cites the U.S. Supreme Court's definitive explanation of the meaning of "includes" when used in the IRC.

I am in this game strictly to win. This means that in virtually every IRS matter we will be filing a criminal complaint under IRC section 7214(a) and taking our criminal complaints to our state attorney general by group, meaning 6 or more at a time. We will give the state attorney general notice that we will check back in 30 days, and if our criminal complaints are not being prosecuted, then every one of us will file a 42 USC § 1983 deprivation of civil rights lawsuit against the state attorney general. 

If filed, our 42 USC § 1983 suits will put the state's errors and omissions insurance in jeopardy, resulting in the state preferring to lose the attorney general rather than losing its insurance, which it must have to operate. No judge can dismiss any of our civil rights suits without becoming named as a defendant to the suit. Press coverage is easy to get for civil rights lawsuits, especially when the underlying criminal complaints are against IRS, DOJ and federal and state judges engaged in official misconduct. The templates will be forthcoming.

I stay strictly with the merits of liability based on the material facts within our personal knowledge corresponding to the definition for "employment" in IRC section 3121. I choose this approach because it conforms to the basic principles of federal income taxation under the Constitution, and is explicitly reasonable, especially in the eyes of a grand jury. A grand jury is ultimately our target audience because our only real remedy with IRS abuse is section 7214(a), which must be turned into an indictment prior to actual prosecution.

There are those who criticize the estoppel letter, such as Tally, but the fact is that the DOJ evades the points in the letter like the plague. If these points were in error, the DOJ would be the first to point it out. But they do not, and are silent. Silence from these lying criminals is golden.

The points in the estoppel letter support the following statement of the issue and discussion of the issue:

Statement of the Issue

1.  The issue in this case is whether John Doe received remuneration during the year 20xx which is properly reportable on the IRS Form 1040 as “wages, salaries, tips, etc.” or "self-employment income" through “employment” as defined at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b), taken together with the complementary definitions for “State, United States and citizen” found at § 3121(e), “American vessel and aircraft” found at § 3121(f), “American employer” found at § 3121(h), and “International agreements” found at 42 U.S.C. § 433.

Discussion of the Issue

2.  Congress has imposed the tax codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 with respect to items of statutory income, not non-statutory income. These items of statutory income are specifically defined throughout the Internal Revenue Code. The general definition for “gross income” found at § 61(a) is limited in scope by complementary statutory definitions that specifically define each specific item of statutory income. In this case, the items of income at issue are defined in section § 3121.

3.  “Wages” is defined twice in the Internal Revenue Code, once at § 3121(a), and again at § 3401(a). The definitions in § 3121 correspond to the tax imposed at § 3101, and the definitions in § 3401 correspond to the federal withholding provisions imposed at § 3402. The “wages” defined at § 3121(a) are those received through “employment” as defined at § 3121(b), taken together with the complementary definitions in § 3121 and 42 U.S.C. § 433. The “wages” defined at § 3401(a) are those received by the “employee” defined at § 3401(c). A review of these definitions shows that the definitions found in § 3401 are a subset of the definitions found in § 3121. Read the definition for “employee” at § 3401(c), and then read the definition for “American employer” at § 3121(h). The definition for “American employer” at § 3121(h) encompasses the employment of the “employee” defined at § 3401(c).

4.  Because the definition for “wages” at § 3401(a) is a subset of the definition for “wages” at § 3121(a), the definitions in § 3121 control the proper accounting of “wages, salaries, tips, etc.” on the face of the IRS Form 1040.

5.  The definitions in § 3121 also control the proper accounting of “self-employment income” on the face of the IRS Form 1040. This is because the definitions in § 1402 corresponding to “self-employment income” including the definition for “employee and wages” also point to the tax imposed at § 3101 and to the definitions in § 3121.

6.  In accordance with the basic principles of Constitutional taxation, “employment” as defined at § 3121(b) is the subject of the tax, and “all remuneration” from “employment” is the measure of the tax.

7.  The purpose of § 3401 is merely to provide definitions corresponding to the federal withholding provisions found in § 3402. Section 3401 does not define “employment”, which is the subject of the tax, because it is already defined in § 3121.

Randall White
(561) 743-6945
randallewhite@me.com
Paralegal Service
6119 Mullin Street
Jupiter, FL 33458

- - - - -  Estoppel Letter 1.8 to Commissioner of Internal Revenue - - - - -

John Doe
123 Anywhere Street
Anytown, CA 12345-6789

March 3, 2011

Certified Mail No. 7007 0220 0003 9592 xxxx

Douglas H. Shulman
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20224

Re: Statutory construction and the meaning of legislative enactments

Dear Commissioner of Internal Revenue:

In order that I can be informed of all information necessary for me to complete my own self-assessment to determine the sums due and owing to the United States Treasury, please provide me with a legal opinion in re the statutory construction of the following legislative enactments and questions about the rules of statutory construction:

1. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(e)(1) defines (for the purposes of Chapter 21, Federal Insurance Contributions Act) "State" as the general class of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa? See Helvering v. Morgan's, 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1, 55 S. Ct. 60, 61 n.1, 79 L. Ed. 232 (1934).
2. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(e)(2) defines (for the purposes of Chapter 21, Federal Insurance Contributions Act) "United States" when used in a geographical sense as the general class of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa? See Helvering v. Morgan's, 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1, 55 S. Ct. 60, 61 n.1, 79 L. Ed. 232 (1934).
3. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(A)(i) taken together with the complementary definitions for "State, United States and citizen" found at § 3121(e) define "employment" "(i) within the United States" to mean performing service by an employee for the employer within the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa?
4. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(A)(ii) taken together with the complementary definitions for "State, United States and citizen" found at § 3121(e), and "American vessel and aircraft" found at § 3121(f), define "employment" "(ii) on or in connection with an American vessel or American aircraft under a contract of service which is entered into within the United States or during the performance of which and while the employee is employed on the vessel or aircraft it touches at a port in the United States, if the employee is employed on and in connection with such vessel or aircraft when outside the United States, to mean performing service by an employee for the employer on or in connection with an American vessel or American aircraft under a contract of service entered into within the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa, or touching at a port in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa?
5. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(B) taken together with the complementary definitions for "State, United States and citizen" found at § 3121(e), and "American employer" found at § 3121(h), define "employment" "(B) outside the United States by a citizen or resident of the United States as an employee for an American employer (as defined in subsection (h))" to mean performing service for the United States or any instrumentality thereof, including for any individual or entity subject to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa?
6. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(C) taken together with the complementary definition for "International agreements" found at 42 U.S.C. § 433 define "employment" "(C) if it is service, regardless of where or by whom performed, which is designated as employment or recognized as equivalent to employment under an agreement entered into under section 233 of the Social Security Act;" to mean working under an international social security old-age, survivors, disability, or derivative benefits agreement?
7. It is true, is it not, that the regulation published by Congress in the Federal Register at 8 FR 12267, § 404.104 for the statutory definition found at 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) defines (for the purposes of Chapter 24, Collection of income tax at source on wages) "employee" as the general class of "officers and employees whether elected or appointed, of the United States, a State, Territory, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing"? See Helvering v. Morgan's, 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1, 55 S. Ct. 60, 61 n.1, 79 L. Ed. 232 (1934).
8. It is true, is it not, that the purpose of providing a statutory definition is to supersede, not enlarge, the common or ordinary dictionary definition of a word? See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 2615 (2000) ("When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning. Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 484-485 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. at 392-393, n. 10 ("As a rule, `a definition which declares what a term "means" ... excludes any meaning that is not stated' "); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490, 502 (1945) ("Of course, statutory definitions of terms used therein prevail over colloquial meanings."); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 95-96, 55 S.Ct. 333, 336 (1935) ("[A] definition by the average man or even by the ordinary dictionary with its studied enumeration of subtle shades of meaning is not a substitute for the definition set before us by the lawmakers with instructions to apply it to the exclusion of all others."); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases)."); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 119 S. Ct. 755, 760 (1999) ("This Court's review -- begins with the statute's language."); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475 (1992) ("In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 190 (1991)."); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2172 (1989) ("The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language."); BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004) ("The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to "presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992). Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous. -- Connecticut Nat. Bank, supra, at 254.").
9. It is true, is it not, that the taxing statutes are strictly construed? See United States v. Stone & Downer, 47 S. Ct. 616, 274 U.S. 225 (1927) ("The rule against enlarging the subject-matter of a statute by judicial interpretation has been applied with great particularity in the case of statutes levying taxes"); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 78 L Ed 2d 17, 104 S Ct. 296 (1983) (""[Where] Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)."); Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153, 38 S.Ct. 53 (1917) ("In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen."); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases).
10. It is true, is it not, that when the verb "means" is used in an Internal Revenue Code definition, the term and its definition are to be interchangeable equivalents; and when the verb "includes" is used in an Internal Revenue Code definition, the definition imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition? See Helvering v. Morgan's, 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1, 55 S. Ct. 60, 61 n.1, 79 L. Ed. 232 (1934), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court explained the meaning of the verbs "means" and "includes" in the context of the Revenue Act of 1926, as follows:

^*fn1 The terms 'means' and 'includes' are not necessarily synonymous. The distinction in their use is aptly pointed by sections 2, 200 of the act itself (26 USCA 1262, 931). Section 2(a) of the act (see 26 USCA 1262(a) and note) gives general definitions of ten terms; of these, three are stated to 'include' designated particular instances, the other seven are stated to 'mean' the definitions subsequently given. Section 200, in addition to the definitions contained in subsection (a), gives four of which two use the verb 'include' and two the verb 'means.' That the draftsman used these words in a different sense seems clear. The natural distinction would be that where 'means' is employed, the term and its definition are to be interchangeable equivalents, and that the verb 'includes' imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition. This view finds support in section 2(b) of the act (26 USCA 1262(b), which reads: 'The terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.'

Note: The definition for "includes" at Section 2(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926 cited by the Court in Helvering v. Morgan's [formerly codified at 26 USCA 1262(b) in the footnote] is now codified word-for-word the same at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c).

11. It is true, is it not, that the principle that "includes" is "not limiting" in the context of an Internal Revenue Code definition does not diminish the principle established in Helvering v. Morgan's that when the verb "includes" is used in an Internal Revenue Code definition, the definition imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition? See Brigham v. United States, 160 F.3d 759 (1st Cir. 1998) ("but "includes" is not limiting. Rather, "[t]he terms 'includes' and 'including' . . . shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c). In light of this we apply the principle that a list of terms should be construed to include by implication those additional terms of like kind and class as the expressly included terms. *fn2 This follows from the canon noscitur a sociis, "a word is known by the company it keeps." Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708-09 (1878)"). The principle that "includes" is "not limiting", the principle that "includes" imports a general class, and the interpretive canon noscitur a sociis are all complementary and harmonious.
12. It is true, is it not, that the Sixteenth Amendment did not repeal or modify Article I and that the Amendment does not have any enactment clause or implementing regulations or budget for implementation, thus the Amendment is merely a philosophical statement made with the object of maintaining the limitations of the Constitution and harmonizing their operation, and that the Amendment does not attempt to do that which, under the Constitution, Congress cannot do? See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12-19, 36 S. Ct. 236 (1916) ("[T]he contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax -- thus destroying the two great classifications [of direct and indirect taxation under the Constitution] is -- wholly without foundation."); and Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1916), ("[B]y the previous ruling [Brushaber] it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged.")
13. It is true, is it not, that the Sixteenth Amendment must be read in light of the United States Constitution, including Article I, Section 9, clause 4, which states, "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken"? See Wright v. United States, 58 S. Ct. 395, 302 U.S. 583, 607 (1938) ("The Court has hitherto consistently held that a literal reading of a provision of the Constitution which defeats a purpose evident when the instrument is read as a whole, is not to be favored. -- "From whatever source derived," as it is written in the Sixteenth Amendment, does not mean from whatever source derived. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245.")
14. It is true, is it not, that because the United States Supreme Court has mandated through case law precedent interpreting the language of the 16th Amendment in the context of the Constitution, including Article I, Section 9, clause 4, it is therefore proper to interpret the substantially similar language in the definition for "gross income" at 26 U.S.C. § 61 in the context of Article I, Section 9, clause 4?
15. It is true, is it not, that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court case law precedent cited above, all taxes imposed in the Internal Revenue Code, including the taxes on "employment" measured by "self-employment income" or "net earnings from self-employment" or "wages", are limited under the Constitution to the class of indirect taxes in the nature of an excise?
16. It is true, is it not, that the statutory definitions corresponding to the taxes imposed in the Internal Revenue Code, including all of those definitions corresponding to the legal requirements for listing "gross income" on the face of an IRS Form 1040, must be strictly construed in conformity with the principle of indirect taxation on the earnings of the individual, so as not to run afoul of the Constitution?
17. It is true, is it not, that all Treasury regulations interpreting the meaning of statutory definitions must conform to United States Supreme Court case law precedent on statutory construction, and that any interpretation of a statutory definition by the Treasury which does not conform to United States Supreme Court case law precedent on statutory construction is null and void?

Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 90 days from the verifiable receipt of this information your silence shall be deemed to verify that the foregoing statements are true in law and you will be deemed estopped by your obligation to adhere to the United States Supreme Court mandated case law precedent on statutory construction from inferring any other meaning to these statutes.

Your silence will be deemed estoppel from inferring any other meaning to these statutes.

This information will be released into the public domain and will be used in any situation deemed lawful.

Respectfully submitted,

John Doe

Copy to:

John A. DiCicco
Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

NOTES:

• Get your zip plus four U.S. postal mailing code because you will need it to obtain the name and mailing address for your State Representative in Congress for the purpose of sending a copy of this letter to him or her. To look up your zip plus four code go to:

http://zip4.usps.com/zip4/zcl_0_landing_error.jsp 

• Then find your Representative's name and mailing address at:

http://www.house.gov/

• Also send a copy to your State Senators in Congress. Find their names and mailing addresses at:

http://www.senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm

• After 90 days lapses, or sooner if the Commissioner responds to your inquiry, and depending on how he responds, if he responds, there will be an appropriate follow-up letter template provided for your next step in establishing estoppel against IRS frivolous arguments.

--

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An Agenda for Repairing State Judiciaries

I like the skit linked below, even though the actors speak with a kind of Skandinavian  lisp. It deals with problems in the legal profession and courts:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7dTJHkq3Bw&feature=player_detailpage


I did not notice in the skit a well-deserved attack on the bar-integrated judiciary as an oligarchy that defies the CUSA's (Constitution's) guarantee of a republican form of government for the states and the state Constitutions' guarantees of separation of powers.  The beginning should hint at it, the middle already fleshes it out to some extent, and the end should punctuate it and call for changes to the constitutions and laws to correct it.  The thing should propose:

• Eliminate all forms of sovereign immunity, especially judicial immunity.
  
• Excise the bar from government altogether.
  
• Mandate licensing and regulation of attorneys by the Executive Branch.
  
• Prohibition of bar membership for attorneys  serving in government
  
• Eliminate all penalties for non-attorney practice of law (tort laws already suffice to punish the wicked) - make the point that lawyers cannot guarantee a quality advocacy or outcome to their clients, around half of opponents in litigation LOSE regardless of the ability of the attorney, and that eliminates all justification for making practice of law exclusive to attorneys.
  
• Mandate judge-paid performance and liability bonds managed by non-government corporations.
  
• Provide simpler ways for victims of judicial abuse to file claims against those bonds, halt judicial activity by the alleged culprit, and speedy hearing of complaints.
  
• Mandate a special grand jury and possibly out-of-state tribunal to indict and prosecute rogue judges who ignore and violate their oaths and their ministerial duties to obey procedural rules and laws.
  
• Mandate news coverage by internet and newspapers of all complaints against judges.
  
• Court watcher database of judicial performance and suggestion box in every court, with results available to the public - what one cannot monitor one cannot control
  
• Make all laws and court rulings organized, consistently presented, and instantly available to the public via internet - people must have access to the law.  The law must become fully findable and knowable.  To this day NOBODY knows the English law still in effect in Florida.
  
• Eliminate judicial precedent more than a year old and require the legislature to assess all rulings and modify the law to make it clear in support of or against that ruling - no other method will terminate legislating from the bench.
  
• Punish trial judges for rulings that appellate courts overturn - penalties like reduced salary, reduced percentage of full retirement benefit will force judges to give the best possible ruling in trial courts.
  
• Eliminate all judicial precedent by non-unanimous panels- if the judges cannot agree on the law, then their majority rulings should bind only those in the instant case.

Without such specific recommendations and a written bullet list of legislative objectives to repair the problem, the video becomes a depressing litany of the unsolvable problems of the courts and the legal profession.

-- ************************************************* Bob Hurt - Home Page - +1 (727) 669-5511 2460 Persian Drive #70 - Clearwater, FL 33763 Donate to my Law Studies Learn to litigate:  Buy and Study JURISDICTIONARY Stay up to date:  Subscribe to Lawmen E-Letter Now *************************************************

On Sun, 2011-03-06 at 08:39 -0600, Jon Roland wrote:

On 03/06/2011 01:17 AM, joseph zernik wrote:

However:

• The comment about corporate law being clean is out to lunch, if you take into account all the national law firms who work today for large financial institutions and mortgage service companies, and engage in fraud on the courts from coast to coast...

I didn't say the entire field was clean. I had the character (Paul) say that one could have a career in that field and not become aware of the corruption. Most of the work of corporate law is advising your client how to engage in contracts, collect on debts, follow regulations, and stay out of trouble. It mostly involves no litigation at all.

• The statement that implies that only "political" cases are perverted today is false.  The most commonly perverted cases are foreclosures.

And those are not "political"? Remember, the definition provided was "cases not decided on merit". That is, cases decided on connections. That is political.

• As shown in Luzerne County, PA, and in Los Angeles County, CA, another class of cases that is often perverted are criminal prosecutions, which lead to imprisonment in corporate-owned, privatized prisons.

The video touches on that.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7dTJHkq3Bw&feature=player_detailpage

Jon Roland

http://constitution.org

Understand the Core Cause of Sovereign Citizen Movement

Crimes in government spark the rise in the Patriot Movement, of which the sovereign citizen movement comprises a somewhat misguided element.

The "misguided" nature comes from insufficient formal education in the ideals of law and good government and the extent to which our existing government has strayed from those ideals because of misbehavior by government employees.

If you Google Sovereign Citizen you'll see hate-mongering by the ADL and SPLC, painting the movement as anti-government, racist, anti-semitic, genocidal, murderous, loony, etc. 

Hiding the law and court documents from the people, keeps the people ignorant.  It makes the law and court rulings inscrutable and unknowable to and by the masses.  That results in fear and distrust of law, law practitioners, and government.  Thus, the more angry folks will naturally seek physical forms of redress of abuses by government criminals.

Generally, patriots only want government employees to

1. comply with laws and rules,
2. enforce the Constitutions' restrictions on government exercise of power, and
3. enforce the Constitutions' guarantee of  the rights of the people and the states.

Physical force applied against government employees by patriots to the above end seems loathsome.  And yet real and threatened physical force clearly characterizes government to a Tee.  Therefore, one can hardly blame the citizenry for gravitating toward it when election fraud thwarts their choice of representatives, legislatures and government commissions ignore complaints about judicial abuse, and petitions for redress of grievance fall on deaf ears. 

The nation's founding documents completely justify physical force as legitimate political action against intractably recalcitrant criminals in government.  Read this in the Declaration of Independence and every original state Constitution.

So before embracing the hate-mongering drivel of ADL and SPLC, truth seekers should carefully examine the issue and grounds for complaint by the sovereign citizens.  The people should correct outnesses in government, and government employees should correct their associates' criminal and unconstitutional behavior BEFORE targeting and punishing the patriot responses to that behavior. 

If Government employees merely start behaving constitutionally,  patritot uprising and public dissent will largely disappear.

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Tax Lien Certificates AND Adverse Possession

Apparently big banks like JP Morgan Chase have started going berzerk buying property tax lien certificates through shadow companies.  The below Alex Jones story bemoans it.

Basically, the realty owner falls behind in property taxes.  This happened to a friend of mine last year.  The county tax collector put tax liens on the property and sold related certificates at auction ON-LINE.  According to state law, she had two years to catch up and in the third year, the certificate holder had the legal right to force a foreclosure sale to collect the money plus interest. 

She had gotten behind TWO years.  At the last minute she used Patriot Myth Magic to pay the taxes.  I won't go into that lurid detail.

Many homeowners don't have such luck and the big banks plan to snatch the houses from them in foreclosure sale for taxes.

Now imagine that you decided to adversely possess your own house after the sheriff or trustee auctioned it off in a foreclosure sale, but the buyer neglected to take possession.  You file a notice of adverse possession and buy your own tax liens with the money you saved on house payments.  A couple of years later you foreclose on yourself (and the rightful owner).

Remember, the tax collector will favor taxes paid by the owner, but an adverse possessor can pay them first, and the tax collector might then return the tax paid by the mortgage servicer from escrow.  That means you will get credit for the payment.  You would take this route if the property had no outstanding tax lien.

In Florida the Adverse Possession period is 7 years and Tax foreclosure period is 3 years.  Which do you like best?  Why not do both?

Yeah, I know.  MUDDY idea.  But, hey, if the big banks can do it why can't you?


http://www.infowars.com/the-big-wall-street-banks-have-found-a-new-way-to-strangle-the-american-people-predatory-property-tax-collection/




The Big Wall Street Banks Have Found A New Way To Strangle The American People: Predatory Property Tax Collection

The Economic Collapse
October 21, 2010

It turns out that the big Wall Street banks have found a dirty new way to make loads of cash from U.S. homeowners, and they really, really don’t want to talk about it.  So what is this dirty new business?  America’s biggest financial institutions have become property tax collectors, and it is extremely lucrative.  From coast to coast, the big Wall Street banks are buying up thousands upon thousands of tax liens and are making a killing by socking distressed homeowners with predatory interest, outrageous penalties and almost unbelievable legal fees. 

In some areas, the big banks are able to foreclose on these homes in as little as six months.  The elderly and the poor are the most common targets of these practices.  An absolutely brilliant expose in the Huffington Post has brought these issues to light, and it is creating quite a controversy in the financial world.  The big banks are doing nothing illegal here.  Local governments are offering to sell thousands of tax liens and somebody is going to end up buying them.  But something seems extremely unsavory about the big Wall Street banks capitalizing on the economic downturn that they were so instrumental in causing in such a predatory manner.

...

According to the Huffington Post, Wall Street banks such as Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase have been gobbling up several hundred thousand tax liens from local governments.  It appears that “distressed housing markets” are being particularly targeted.

...

Just consider the following tragic storyfrom the Huffington Post article….

Barbara Carpenter, a 58-year-old disabled Ohio retiree, found herself in such a situation. The former worker for the American Red Cross struggled to save her Toledo home from a JPMorgan entity called Plymouth Park Tax Services, which in recent years has been among the nation’s top buyers of tax liens.

“It’s a great neighborhood and the house is in good condition,”said Carpenter, who paid $67,000 for the one-story home in 2004. But she fell behind in paying her taxes and a certificate for $1,500 in unpaid taxes was sold off to Plymouth Park, which is based in New Jersey.

Carpenter’s lawyer, Joseph Westmeyer, said Plymouth Park routinely charges an upfront fee of around $1,500 as soon as it buys the lien and 18 percent interest on the debt. If they don’t get paid, they foreclose.

“It’s not a good deal for poor customers,” said Westmeyer. Carpenter wound up selling the house in August for less than half what she had paid. Plymouth Park received about $12,000 in legal fees and other charges, including some additional taxes, Westmeyer said, quoting from court records.

...

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How Patriotism arises from crimes in government

I have published a variety of issues to show the spread of interest in the Patriot movement.  I have addressed issues having to do with the IRS, foreclosures, police abuse of the people, and so on.  I assert this reality as the fundamental theme:

Government Crimes  Stimulate Patriot Response Demanding Return to Constitutionality and Excise of the Criminals.

I see our government as essentially good to the extent its employees enforce the Constitution's limits on government power and its guarantees of the rights of the people and the states. 

When they don't do that they thereby invite their excision, whether by letter writing, voting, million man marches, Watts riots, guerilla assassination, or violent open rebellion as  the Declaration of Independence described and justified. 

The People will use the degree of physical force they deem that they must in direct consequence of the egregiousness of Government employees' crimes.  

Essentially, a criminal in government operates a shadow, ultra-vires (unconstitutional and unlawful) government under color of law and legitimacy.  Their ultra-vires behavior constitutes a crime of treason, or betrayal of trust.  Its iniquity monumentally exceeds that any crime committed by a street thug who operates openly as a criminal.  Why?  Because Government perpetrators of crimes (I call them "Gerps") commit the crimes under color of law.

Gerps typically disguise their crimes as lawful behavior.  And they encourage their enabler-operatives in ACORN (R.I.P.),  the Anti-Defamation League, and Southern Poverty Law Center to attack any who expose the crimes.  They accuse such targets as racists, bigots, anti-semites, anti-government, pro-lifers, homophobes, birthers, tea-baggers, etc.

Just as government draws criminals because of its potentially unbridled use of power and lethal force, so does the more militant side of the Patriot movement.  So, some people outside government can begin to commit crimes in the name of patriotism, just as criminals inside government commit crimes under color of law.  Thus, the People should see both types of criminals as dangerous to the state and the nation, and eliminate their presence in positions of power.

The press has the best opportunity to mold public opinion in favor of the ideals of good government, but to do this, reporters and their executive managers must understand and adhere to those ideals.  They can only do that by shunning special interest enablers who seek to demonize Government in general, or the Patriot movement in general.  Always must we journalists deal in specifics, encourage adherence of government employees to the constitutions and compliance to their oaths through destruction of any "good old boys network" that fosters crime or flouting of law and rules. 

The nation has far more to fear from Gerps and their enablers in the courts and partisan political groups than from overzealous patriots.

No single characteristic of government causes more disenchantment with government than the concept and unconstitutional practice of sovereign immunity.  Judicial immunity constitutes the most disastrous form of sovereign immunity because the people have virtually no defense against rogue judges who declare themselves above the law.

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SCOTUS, 20110302: Amendment One Protects Political Speech; Alito Dissents

SCOTUS:   Amendment 1 Protects ALL Political Speech
Alito dissents

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf

See text below. 

The IRS wanted to stop Preachers from denigrating government or certain politicians, and from encouraging their flocks to vote for the Preacher's candidate of choice.  And if they didn't stop, the IRS intended to tax them as political organizations.

In this case, church members picketed a soldier's funeral because, as they said, "God hates Fags" in the military.  The dead soldier's father sued for emotional injury.

I personally hate the IRS unconstitutional collection of income tax from people who don't owe it. 

I likewise hate the preacher fomenting of parishioner discontent by railing for or against some politician or government practice.  And I hate church picketing in a way that demeans soldiers who died in what they considered the cause of liberty.

Why?  Preachers have one basic boss - God.  And they have two basic jobs:  teach people about God, and manage the sanctuary for worship by and socializing of fellow believers. 

That makes anything having to do with government or politics OFF-LIMITS to them.  Why?  Because certain political positions, like picketing against allowing homos in the military, would drive opponents of those positions out of the family of God.  Jesus, Moses, Muhammad, and Buddha don't like their preachers doing that.

I Hate the SIN of it all, see?

What's sin?  Intentional embrace of cosmic unreality.  It leads one who continuously treads its path to personality annihilation.  Not a good thing, as Martha might say.  So I hate it.

I hate it a LOT.  I hate it BIG TIME.  I hate it because it drives people away from God and it obscures the divinity IN people.  So I encourage myself and others to avoid sin like the plague.  My daddy, a sometime sinner like me, advised me "Son, do what you think is right."  I have never found any better advice to follow.  Or, as Jesus said "Go, and sin no more... Be you therefore perfect, even as your Father in Heaven is perfect... Love one another as I have loved you." 

You get the idea.

Apparently, the US Supremes see punishing churches who picket a fallen soldier's funeral as a far bigger sin than preachers emotionally injuring people by  talking against Republicans or Democrats or homos-in-the-military, or imams talking against all of them by encouraging holy jihad.  Oh, yes, we do have a dark side of political speech in religious institutions.

But eight of the Supremes didn't care.  They, like I, want anyone and everyone to say what they have to say, to their heart's content, wherever, whenever, however.  Except in Congress or Court, of course.  The Supremes don't protect any kind of speech or picketing there, except at their whim.

Without feeling disgruntled over the Supreme Court's hypocrisy, let us revel in joy over this ruling. 

But, people still must speak responsibly and not slander or injure others wrongly with words.  So while you revel, remember to obey these points for progressing toward happiness.  They come from that pragmatic little book The Four Agreements:

• I am impeccable in my word
• I take nothing personally
• I assume nothing
• I do the best I can at the moment.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SNYDER v. PHELPS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09–751. Argued October 6, 2010—Decided March 2, 2011

For the past 20 years, the congregation of the Westboro Baptist Church has picketed military funerals to communicate its belief that God hates the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s military. The church’s picketing has also condemned the Catholic Church for scandals involving its clergy. Fred Phelps, who founded the church, and six Westboro Baptist parishioners (all relatives of Phelps) traveled to Maryland to picket the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who was killed in Iraq inthe line of duty. The picketing took place on public land approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held, in accordance with guidance from local law enforcement officers. The picketers peacefully displayed their signs—stating, e.g., “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “America is Doomed,” “Priests Rape Boys,” and “You’re Going to Hell”—for about 30 minutes before the funeral began. Matthew Snyder’s father (Snyder), petitioner here, saw the tops of the picketers’ signs when driving to the funeral, but did not learn what was written on the signs until watching a news broadcast later that night. Snyder filed a diversity action against Phelps, his daughters—who participated in the picketing—and the church (collectively Westboro) alleging, as relevant here, state tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. A jury held Westboro liable for millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Westboro challenged the verdict as grossly excessive and sought judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the First Amendment fully protected its speech. The District Court reduced the punitive damages award, but left the verdict otherwise intact. The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that Westboro’s statements were entitled to First Amendment protection because those statements were on matters of public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed solely through hyperbolic rhetoric.

Held: The First Amendment shields Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case. Pp. 5–15.

(a) The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 50-51. Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. “[S]peech on public issues occupies the ‘ “highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values” ’ and is entitled to special protection.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 145. Although the boundaries of what constitutes speech on matters of public concern are not well defined, this Court has said that speech is of public concern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” id., at 146, or when it “is a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public,” San Diego v. Roe, 543 U. S. 77, 83–84. A statement’s arguably “inappropriate or controversial character . . . is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 387. Pp. 5–7.

To determine whether speech is of public or private concern, this Court must independently examine the “ ‘content, form, and context,’ ” of the speech “ ‘as revealed by the whole record.’ ” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 761. In considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all aspects of the speech. Pp. 7–8.

 

The “content” of Westboro’s signs plainly relates to public, rather than private, matters. The placards highlighted issues of public import—the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of the Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—and Westboro conveyed its views on those issues in a manner designed to reach as broad a public audience as possible. Even if a few of the signs were viewed as containing messages related to a particular individual, that would not change the fact that the dominant theme of Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader public issues. P. 8.

The “context” of the speech—its connection with Matthew Snyder’s funeral—cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech. The signs reflected Westboro’s condemnation of much in modern society, and it cannot be argued that Westboro’s use of speech on public issues was in any way contrived to insulate a personal attack on Snyder from liability. Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that the picketing did not represent Westboro’s honestly held beliefs on public issues. Westboro may have chosen the picket location to increase publicity for its views, and its speech may have been particularly hurtful to Snyder. That does not mean that its speech should be afforded less than full First Amendment protection under the circumstances of this case. Pp. 8–10. That said, “ ‘[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.’ ” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 479. Westboro’s choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the Government’s regulatory reach—it is “subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.” Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293. The facts here are quite different, however, both with respect to the activity being regulated and the means of restricting those activities, from the few limited situations where the Court has concluded that the location of targeted picketing can be properly regulated under provisions deemed content neutral. Frisby, supra, at 477; Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 768, distinguished. Maryland now has a law restricting funeral picketing but that law was not in effect at the time of these events, so this Court has no occasion to consider whether that law is a “reasonable time, place, or manner restrictio[n]” under the standards announced by this Court. Clark, supra, at 293. Pp. 10–12.

 

The “special protection” afforded to what Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was “outrageous” for purposes of applying the state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. That would pose too great a danger that the jury would punish Westboro for its views on matters of public concern. For all these reasons, the jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside. Pp. 12–13. (b) Snyder also may not recover for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. He argues that he was a member of a captive audience at his son’s funeral, but the captive audience doctrine—which has been applied sparingly, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 736– 738; Frisby, supra, at 484–485—should not be expanded to the circumstances here. Westboro stayed well away from the memorial service, Snyder could see no more than the tops of the picketers’ signs, and there is no indication that the picketing interfered with the funeral service itself. Pp. 13–14.

(c) Because the First Amendment bars Snyder from recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon seclusion—the allegedly unlawful activity Westboro conspired to accomplish—Snyder also cannot recover for civil conspiracy based on those torts. P. 14. (d) Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. It did not disrupt Mathew Snyder’s funeral, and its choice to picket at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech. Because this Nation has chosen to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that public debate is not stifled, Westboro must be shielded from tort liability for its picketing in this case. Pp. 14–15.

 

580 F. 3d 206, affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

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