Thursday, September 17, 2015

IF the servicer's home preservation company steals your stuff...

This US 8th Circuit Appellate opinion should give you heart, IF you can get a damages award from an arbitrator or trial court for theft of your stuff by a home preservation company's felonious employees.  In this case, the arbitrator awarded the Starks $6 million to punish the servicer, note holder, and home preservation company for breaking into the home during a foreclosure dispute after the Starks had moved into an apartment across the street (still in possession, did not abandon).  The 8th Circuit upheld the award.  Appellants appealed to the SCOTUS which denied certiorari.

https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F3/381/381.F3d.793.03-2366.html


381 F.3d 793
Stanley William STARK; Patricia Garnet Stark, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SANDBERG, PHOENIX & VON GONTARD, P.C.; Scott Greenberg; EMC Mortgage Corporation; SpvG Trustee, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 03-2366.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: January 15, 2004.
Filed: August 26, 2004.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Ortrie D. Smith, J. COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Roy B. True, argued, Kansas City, Missouri, for appellant.
Mark G. Arnold, argued, St. Louis, Missouri (Robert B. Best, Jr. and Leonard L. Wagner on the brief), for appellant.
Before BYE, HEANEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
BYE, Circuit Judge.
1
Stanley and Patricia Stark appeal the district court's order vacating in part an arbitration award granting them punitive damages. We reverse.
2
* Stanley and Patricia are husband and wife and live near Kansas City, Missouri. In 1999, in hopes of shoring up a failing business, the Starks borrowed $56,900 against their home and secured the loan with a mortgage. Despite the infusion of funds, the business failed and in April 2000 the Starks petitioned for bankruptcy protection. At about the same time, the Starks' lender sold the note, which was in default, to EMC Mortgage Corporation making EMC a debt collector under the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o. In anticipation of foreclosure, the Starks vacated the home and moved into an apartment across the street. The Starks, however, remained in possession of legal title and did not abandon the home. In June 2000, EMC's motion to lift the automatic stay was granted and it proceeded with foreclosure.
3
The Starks were represented throughout the foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings by attorney Roy True who notified EMC's attorney, Scott Greenberg of Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., that his representation of the Starks extended beyond the bankruptcy proceedings. Between October 2000 and March 2001, despite letters from True advising EMC he represented the Starks and not to contact them directly, EMC tried several times to deal directly with the Starks. In April 2001, the Starks filed suit against EMC and its attorneys alleging violations of the FDCPA.
4
EMC moved to compel arbitration as required by the parties' loan agreement, and the district court ordered the dispute submitted to arbitration. The order compelling arbitration is not at issue in this appeal. During the pendency of the arbitration, EMC's agent, without the Starks' consent, forcibly entered the home and posted a sign in the front window indicating the "Property has been secured and winterized. Not for sale or rent. In case of emergency call 1st American (732) 363-3626." The agent then contacted Mrs. Stark at her apartment, and EMC contacted Mr. Stark at work regarding the matter. Further, on November 5, 2001 and January 27, 2002, EMC wrote to the Starks directly regarding insurance coverage on the home. In total, the Starks testified EMC contacted them by mail, telephone or in person at least ten times after being advised they were represented by counsel.
5
After these incidents, the Starks moved to amend their complaint to include claims alleging intentional torts against EMC and seeking punitive damages. EMC opposed the motion arguing the arbitration agreement expressly precluded an award of punitive damages. The Starks contended the limitation on punitive damages was unconscionable and unenforceable. After extensive briefing, the arbitrator concluded the limitation was ambiguous and construed the language against EMC. The arbitrator noted the agreement purported to grant him "all powers provided by law" and then purported to deny the power to award "punitive ... damages ... as to which borrower and lender expressly waive any right to claim to the fullest extent permitted by law." The arbitrator concluded,
6
In at least three places the Stark's [sic] are promised that they can seek all damages allowed by law, and then that promise is taken away. This is the keystone of an ambiguous contract, and the Agreement is to be interpreted in their favor. As a matter of law they are not prohibited from seeking punitive damages from EMC.
7
Appellee's app. at 22.
8
The arbitrator found EMC violated the FDCPA and awarded the Starks $1000 each in statutory damages, $1000 each in actual damages, $22,780 in attorneys fees, and $9300 for the cost of the arbitration. The arbitrator found EMC's forcible entry into the premises "reprehensible and outrageous and in total disregard of plaintiff's [sic] legal rights" and awarded $6,000,000 in punitive damages against EMC. Id. app. at 17.1
9
The Starks moved to confirm the award, and EMC moved to vacate the punitive damages award arguing the arbitration agreement expressly prohibited punitive damages. No other aspect of the award was challenged. The district court vacated the award of punitive damages, holding the agreement was unambiguous and not susceptible to the arbitrator's interpretation.
10
On appeal, the Starks contend the arbitrator acted within his authority in construing the contract and his finding of an ambiguity was not irrational. EMC argues the district court's order vacating the award of punitive damages should be affirmed.
II
11
When reviewing a district court's order confirming or vacating an arbitral award, the court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and questions of law are reviewed de novo. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-48, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995); Titan Wheel Corp. of Iowa v. Local 2048, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 253 F.3d 1118, 1119 (8th Cir. 2001).
12
When reviewing an arbitral award, courts accord "an extraordinary level of deference" to the underlying award itself, Keebler Co. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, Local No. 471, 80 F.3d 284, 287 (8th Cir.1996), because federal courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an arbitral award "even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract." Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Graphic Communication Int'l Union, Local 1B, 284 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir.2002) (quotingUnited Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987)). Indeed, an award must be confirmed even if a court is convinced the arbitrator committed a serious error, so "long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority." Bureau of Engraving, 284 F.3d at 824 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38).
13
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, established "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Thus, the FAA only allows a district court to vacate an arbitration award
14
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
15
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
16
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
17
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
18
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
19
Similarly, under 9 U.S.C. § 11 a reviewing court may only modify the arbitrator's award
20
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
21
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
22
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.
23
9 U.S.C. § 11.
24
A "district court must take the award as it finds it and either vacate the entire award using section 10 or modify the award using section 11." Legion Ins. Co. v. VCW, Inc., 198 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir.1999). The deference owed to arbitration awards, however, "is not the equivalent of a grant of limitless power," Leed Architectural Prods., Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 6674, 916 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir.1990), and "courts are neither entitled nor encouraged simply to `rubber stamp' the interpretations and decisions of arbitrators."Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir.1996). Thus, courts may also vacate arbitral awards which are "completely irrational" or "evidence[] a manifest disregard for the law." Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir.2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
25
An award is "irrational where it fails to draw its essence from the agreement" or it "manifests disregard for the law where the arbitrators clearly identify the applicable, governing law and then proceed to ignore it." Id. at 461-62. "An arbitrator's award draws its essence from the [parties' agreement] as long as it is derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention." Johnson Controls, Inc., Sys. & Servs. Div. v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 39 F.3d 821, 825 (7th Cir.1994) (internal quotations omitted).
26
Faced with these limitations on a court's ability to review arbitration awards, EMC argues the arbitrator's award of punitive damages was properly vacated under § 10 because the arbitrator exceeded his powers by modifying the unambiguous agreement, and properly modified under § 11 because in considering the issue of punitive damages the arbitrator made a decision on a matter not submitted to him.2 EMC also argues the arbitrator's finding of an ambiguity was irrational and without foundation in reason or fact because the clear language of the agreement precludes an award of punitive damages. Finally, EMC argues the award of punitive damages was excessive and made in manifest disregard of the law. Because we conclude the arbitration agreement unambiguously permitted the award of punitive damages, we hold the award of punitive damages was proper and reverse the district court.
III
27
The plain language of the arbitration agreement states the "borrower and lender expressly waive any right to claim [punitive damages] to the fullest extent permitted by law." Appellee's app. at 19 (emphasis added). Thus, the agreement only effected a limited waiver of punitive damages, that is, punitive damages were waived only if the governing law permitted such a waiver. Conversely, if the law did not permit the waiver of punitive damages, the arbitration agreement unambiguously preserved the right to claim them.
28
Under Missouri law "there is no question that one may never exonerate oneself from future liability for intentional torts or for gross negligence, or for activities involving the public interest." Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo.1996) (citingLiberty Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40, 48 (Mo.App.1984)) (in turn citing 6A Corbin on Contracts, § 1472 (1962)). An attempt to procure a waiver of punitive damages is an attempt to exonerate oneself from future liability for intentional torts or gross negligence, because the remedy of punitive damages would otherwise be available for such acts. Thus, Missouri law did not permit EMC to exonerate itself from liability for the intentional torts committed against the Starks by procuring the punitive damages waiver, and the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in awarding punitive damages.
29
We recognize the FAA allows parties to incorporate terms into arbitration agreements that are contrary to state law. See UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Sciences, Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir.1998) (holding "[p]arties may choose to be governed by whatever rules they wish regarding how an arbitration itself will be conducted.") (citation omitted). Thus, had the parties to this agreement intended its interpretation to be governed solely by the FAA, the punitive damages waiver might have barred any such award. The plain language of the agreement, however, makes it clear Missouri law applies to this issue.
30
The agreement's arbitration clause provides,
31
Arbitration. To the extent allowed by applicable law, any Claim ... shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with (1) the Federal Arbitration Act, . . . (2) the Expedited Procedures of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association ... and (3) this Agreement.
32
Appellee's app. at 19 (emphasis added).
33
The agreement then defines applicable law as "the laws of the state in which the property which secures the Transaction is located." Id.(emphasis added). In other words, the agreement makes clear the parties intent to apply Missouri state substantive law while operating within the framework of the FAA, American Arbitration Association rules and the agreement. As previously noted, the punitive damages waiver expressly states the parties intended to waive punitive damages only to the extent permitted by Missouri law. Because Missouri law would not permit a waiver under the facts of this case, we hold the arbitrator's award of punitive damages was proper.
IV
34
Alternatively, while we believe the plain meaning of the agreement supports the award of punitive damages, we also conclude the arbitrator's finding of an ambiguity was not irrational.
35
The arbitration clause states any claims will be resolved in accordance with the FAA, which permits a waiver of punitive damages. The choice of laws provision, however, states claims must be resolved in accordance with "applicable [Missouri] law," which does not permit the waiver of punitive damages argued for by EMC in this case. Thus, an arbitrator could reasonably conclude this agreement is ambiguous.
36
In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995), the Supreme Court considered the juxtaposition of a choice of laws provision prohibiting punitive damages with an arbitration clause permitting an award of punitive damages. The Court concluded "[a]t most, the choice-of-law clause introduces an ambiguity into an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive damages awards." Id. (Emphasis added). As in Mastrobuono, an arbitrator interpreting this agreement could reasonably conclude the apparent conflict between the arbitration clause and the choice of laws provision introduced an ambiguity into the agreement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's recognition that an ambiguity is created when an agreement purports to be governed by conflicting state and federal law is instructive, and supports the arbitrator's finding of an ambiguity.
37
Additionally, we cannot ignore well-settled precedent from this court holding state contract law governs whether an arbitration agreement is ambiguous. See Lyster v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir.2001). Under Missouri law, "[t]he primary rule in the interpretation of a contract is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intention." Speedie Food Mart, Inc. v. Taylor, 809 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Mo.Ct.App.1991). The test for determining if an ambiguity exists in a written contract is "whether the disputed language, in the context of the entire agreement, is reasonably susceptible of more than one construction giving the words their plain meaning as understood by a reasonable average person." Speedie Food Mart, 809 S.W.2d at 129.
38
In this case, EMC argues the exclusionary language is clear and unambiguous and shields it from liability for any award of punitive damages. When viewed in the context of Missouri law governing exculpatory clauses, however, this clause could easily be viewed as ambiguous. "A `latent ambiguity' arises where a writing on its face appears clear and unambiguous, but some collateral matter makes the meaning uncertain." Royal Banks of Missouri v. Fridkin, 819 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (citation omitted). Here, the ambiguity arises because the clause attempts to effect a prospective waiver of rights which Missouri law holds may not be waived. Under Missouri law "there is no question that one may never exonerate oneself from future liability for intentional torts or for gross negligence, or for activities involving the public interest." Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337 (citations omitted). Words purporting to waive claims which cannot be waived "demonstrate the ambiguity of the contractual language." Id.
39
Finally, EMC "cannot overcome the common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous language against the interest of the party that drafted it." Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62, 115 S.Ct. 1212 (citations omitted). EMC "cannot now claim the benefit of the doubt. The reason for this rule is to protect the party who did not choose the language from an unintended or unfair result." Id. at 63, 115 S.Ct. 1212.
40
Accordingly, we conclude the arbitrator's finding that the contract was ambiguous was not irrational.
V
41
EMC next argues the award of punitive damages was properly vacated because it is excessive and exhibits a manifest disregard of the law. We disagree.
42
"Beyond the grounds for vacation provided in the FAA, an award will only be set aside where it is completely irrational or evidences a manifest disregard for the law." Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 461 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). "These extra-statutory standards are extremely narrow: ... [A]n arbitration decision only manifests disregard for the law where the arbitrators clearly identify the applicable, governing law and then proceed to ignore it." Id. at 461-62 (citing Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 749-50 (8th Cir.1986)) (emphasis added).
43
"A party seeking vacatur [based on manifest disregard of the law] bears the burden of proving that the arbitrators were fully aware of the existence of a clearly defined governing legal principle, but refused to apply it, in effect, ignoring it." Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir.2003). Because "[a]rbitrators are not required to elaborate their reasoning supporting an award," El Dorado Sch. Dist. # 15 v. Continental Cas. Co., 247 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir.2001) (internal quotations omitted), "[i]f they choose not to do so, it is all but impossible to determine whether they acted with manifest disregard for the law." W. Dawahare v. Spencer,210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir.2000) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995)).
44
Manifest disregard of the law "is more than a simple error in law or a failure by the arbitrators to understand or apply it; and, it is more than an erroneous interpretation of the law." Duferco Int'l, 333 F.3d at 389 (citations omitted). "Our disagreement with an arbitrator's interpretation of the law or determination of the facts is an insufficient basis for setting aside his award." El Dorado Sch. Dist., 247 F.3d at 847 (citing Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 462).
45
In support of its claim, EMC argues the arbitrator disregarded the Supreme Court's pronouncements in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,517 U.S. 559, 572-74, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996) (describing a 500:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages as "breathtaking" and suspicious), and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003) (finding a 145:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages presumptively excessive). In so arguing, however, EMC has failed to present any evidence that the arbitrator "clearly identif[ied] the applicable, governing law and then proceed[ed] to ignore it." Hoffman,236 F.3d at 461-62 (citing Stroh Container, 783 F.2d at 749-50). None of the cases relied upon by EMC are cited in the arbitrator's decision,3 and there is nothing in the record to demonstrate "one of the parties clearly stated the law and the arbitrator[ ] expressly chose not to follow it." W. Dawahare, 210 F.3d at 670; see also Duferco Int'l, 333 F.3d at 390 ("In determining an arbitrator's awareness of the law, we impute only knowledge of governing law identified by the parties to the arbitration.") (citation omitted).
46
Indeed, to the extent the arbitrator's decision sets forth the basis for the punitive damages award, it is apparent the arbitrator did not disregard governing law. The arbitrator's award was intended to punish EMC and to deter others from similar conduct. In arriving at the appropriate amount, the arbitrator specifically found the $6,000,000 award (amounting to one-tenth of one percent of shareholder equity) was "not great punishment but it should act as a deterence [sic]." Appellee's app. at 18; see also Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 655 (Mo.App.1998) (holding under Missouri law the net worth of a defendant is relevant when determining the extent of punitive damages necessary to punish and deter the defendant). Accordingly, we reject EMC's claim of manifest disregard.
47
"Although this result may seem draconian, the rules of law limiting judicial review and the judicial process in the arbitration context are well established and the parties ... can be presumed to have been well versed in the consequences of their decision to resolve their disputes in this manner." Stroh Container, 783 F.2d at 751. Moreover, "[a]rbitration is not a perfect system of justice, nor it is [sic] designed to be."Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 462 (citation omitted). Rather, it "is designed primarily to avoid the complex, time-consuming and costly alternative of litigation." Id.
48
In the arbitration setting we have almost none of the protections that fundamental fairness and due process require for the imposition of this form of punishment. Discovery is abbreviated if available at all. The rules of evidence are employed, if at all, in a very relaxed manner. The factfinders (here the panel) operate with almost none of the controls and safeguards [present in traditional litigation.]
49
Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 889 (8th Cir. 1993) (Beam, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50
Here, EMC chose to resolve this "dispute quickly and efficiently through arbitration." Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir.2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1414, 158 L.Ed.2d 81 (2004). Indeed, it was EMC that insisted on removing the matter to arbitration. In so doing, EMC "got exactly what it bargained for." Id. "Having entered such a contract, [EMC] must subsequently abide by the rules to which it agreed." Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 463 (citation omitted).
VI
51
We reverse the district court's order vacating the award of punitive damages and remand with instructions to confirm the arbitrator's award in its entirety.
Notes:
1
The arbitrator indicated the award of punitive damages was calculated as one percent of EMC's shareholder equity. One percent of equity, however, would have resulted in an award of $60,000,000. The arbitrator later clarified this mistake indicating it was his intent to award $6,000,000. Thus, the award was actually calculated as one-tenth of one percent of shareholder equity
2
EMC's § 11 argument is clearly without merit. The issue of punitive damages was submitted to the arbitrator. If the award was improper because it exceeded the scope of the agreement, § 10 is the proper avenue to redress the arbitrator's error
3
The arbitrator's decision predatesState Farm making it impossible for the arbitrator to have identified the decision as controlling.

Sunday, August 30, 2015

Polygraph proves Lorenzo Bean INNOCENT of embezzlement charges

Lorenzo Lee Bean III
 Rumormill
Lorenzo Bean has passed a formal lie detector test with flying colors!

Conclusion: Bean is 100% innocent of all embezzlement charges in Fauquier and Loudon counties.

Put this in perspective...

Commonwealth Attorney James Fisher used prosecutorial misconduct to manipulate a Special Grand Jury into wrongly indicting attorney Lorenzo Bean for embezzlement while Fisher likely had evidence that Bean's office manager Candace Fissell was the actual embezzler (had embezzled tens of thousands of dollars from Bean).  Judge Beck in Fauquier County, VA, Circuit Court dismissed the indictment for PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 10 days ago.  And now Bean's polygraph test proves that Bean told the truth that he committed no wrongdoing in connection with the charges against him.

Fauquier news media leaders at the Fauquier Times Democrat newspaper wrote a biased articles referring to the prosecutorial misconduct as a mistake or technicality, thereby whitewashing the terrible due process denial that Fisher engineered.

http://www.fauquiernow.com/index.php/fauquier_news/article/fauquier-judge-tosses-embezzlement-charges-against-lawyer-2015

Reporters and editors of Fauquier.com and Faquiernow.com should find it quite easy to track and verify the rumor.  If no news item appears within a day or so (I just reported it to them), readers can reach only one logical conclusion: Faquier Times-Democrat and related web site owners have put themselves in the virtual employ of arch enemy of due process, empire-builder James Fisher - they thereby show that they have become his BITCHES (to put it nicely).

VOTERS OF FAUQUIER COUNTY - The time has come to recall James Fisher. This writer thinks Fisher should get fired, lose his bar membership, and spend a few years in prison.

Forward this message to everybody you know in Virginia.  Prosecutorial Misconduct is becoming a rampant plague against the innocent and the guilty there.

Leave your comments at the above linked fauquiernow article, and CHIDE the editors and reporters for convicting Bean by tainting potential jurors through their articles about the Lorenzo Bean case.



Bob Hurt

Friday, August 28, 2015

Virginia Judge Shuts Down Rabid Prosecutors Effort to Destroy Lorenzo Lee Bean

Lorenzo Lee Bean III
I read these two articles and a number of others at the http://fauquier.com and http://fauquiernow.com about the case of Lorenzo Lee Bean, a Virginia attorney charged with embezzlement, money laundering, and related tax crimes by rabid Commonwealth Attorney James Fisher.  It seemed to me that the journal reporters and editors worked overtime to mollycoddle the prosecutor's version of the story.  Their news items look as though the prosecutors spoon fed them to reporters who then dutifully DESTROYED the Bean's character.  They even published mug shots of him instead of a photo they had on file of Bean in a business suit.

See the two articles describing how the Commonwealth Attorney lost because of Prosecutorial Misconduct:


I decided to dig in further and write about it.

 -------------------------------------------- Comment -------------

"Legal Mistake?"  “Technicality?”  Prosecutorial and Investigatory Misconduct does not equate to a mere legal mistake or technicality.  It constitutes a carefully calculated and orchestrated scheme to get a "non-guilty" person, in this case Lorenzo Lee Bean, an attorney with a 32-year career, indicted, prosecuted, convicted, and sent to prison.  In this way, the Commonwealth Attorney attempted to destroy the innocent man’s personal and business life.  But it didn't work.

Through a fortuitous set of circumstances, the defense team received the transcripts of Special Grand Jury testimony by Detective Bradley Gregor and Bean’s former employee Candace Fissell.  Fissell admitted that she had embezzled tens of thousands of dollars from Bean and cooked his books to hide her crime while she worked for Bean as his trusted office manager. The Commonwealth Attorney probably became acutely aware of Fissell’s embezzlement and book-cooking while investigating Bean and long before Fissell confessed to it, but gave her immunity from prosecution anyway. 

To top it off, Commonwealth Attorney James Fisher and his minions Jamey Cook and Russell Rabb, continued their pogrom against Bean while leaving Fissell employed in Bean’s office for MONTHS to do whatever further damage to Bean and his clients that she wished.  The Commonwealth thereby became a witting accomplice to whatever continued embezzlement Fissell chose to pursue. 

Then, according to Bean’s defense team’s Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial and  Investigative Misconduct (see link below), agents of the Commonwealth instructed Fissell to go into Bean’s office toward the end of her employment to gather evidence against him without a subpoena, and to give the evidence to them in exchange for immunity from prosecution.  They then used Fissell’s stolen QuickBooks report of Bean’s trust account to justify an effort to revoke Bean’s bond.  The Fauquier Times-Democrat (22 April 2015) reported accounts of what Fissell said.

At the bond revocation hearing, the Commonwealth offered Fissell’s testimony to support its motion to revoke.  The judge responded that he did not need to hear from an admitted embezzler (Fissell), and denied the motion to revoke.  Anyone with common sense should wonder why Commonwealth Attorney James Fisher and the Commonwealth would protect as a star witness an admitted embezzler, Candace Fissell, unless of course Fisher has a hidden motive for destroying Bean’s life.

This skullduggery by the Commonwealth Attorney’s team has become the newest poster child for prosecutorial misconduct.  Bean is the real victim in this mess, and the Commonwealth Attorneys campaigned to destroy him while sending the real embezzler into Bean’s office to sabotage him and help them build their phony case against him. These prosecutors, every one of them, belong in prison for many years.  THEY are the biggest villains in this story because they targeted an innocent man and let the real crook go free. Common sense says that they constitute a real and present danger to ALL of the innocent citizens of Fauquier County because they can target any citizen at any time for any reason and destroy that citizen’s life with utter and absolute impunity.

The defense team received able assistance from the brilliant founder of litigation consultancy firm Law Partner On Call (http://lawpartneroncall.com), a renowned expert in anulling indictments.  

The defense moved the court to dismiss the charges, thereby exposing the rotten underbelly of Commonwealth Attorney James Fisher and particularly his assistant prosecutor Jamey Cook.  Those bad actors apparently manipulated and suborned the Grand Jury through a variety of out and out deceptive and misleading shenanigans.  The prosecutor voluntarily dismissed the tax crime charges and Judge Beck dismissed the indictment for the other charges.

Prosecutorial and Investigatory misconduct (crookedness intended to fool the grand jury into indicting and to flamboozle the defendant into taking a plea bargain conviction without a trial) is RAMPANT across the nation, particularly in Virginia, and MOST particularly in Fauquier County.  Read these indicting proofs:

Get the picture?  Prosecutors in the Lorenzo Bean case have violated Bean’s due process rights in spite of knowing that their star witness, Candace Fissell, admitted embezzling money from Lorenzo Bean’s law firm.  And they know that all others in the firm have steadfastly maintained their innocence and denied any wrong doing.  The public must not ignore this terrible reality when it comes time to vote for its next Commonwealth Attorney.

Now let us take a look at Bean’s amended motion to dismiss that caused Judge Beck to kick out the Lorenzo Bean indictment in order to avoid a blight on the Virginia judiciary.

And take note as you read the motion that it became available to reporter Michael Melkonian who fawned over the prosecutors as he wrote the one-sided article “Legal Mistake Fouls Embezzlement Charges Against Lawyer. He should have entitled it “Prosecutors Destroy Their Case with Misconduct.”

SHAME on you Michael Melkonian for regurgitating into the face of readers the disgusting excrement Commonwealth Attorney James Fisher spoon-feeds you. And SHAME on you Editors for tolerating such biased reporting. YOU should have published the motion and resulting order. Why did I have to do it for you? I consider you a disgrace to honest journalism. 

Get the Motion to Dismiss here:


And here I provide the text of the Court's righteous order of dismissal:

------------- COURT RULING -----------------

VIRGINIA:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF FAUQUIER

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
VS.                        CASE NO. CR14-540 through CR14-546, CR15-29 & CR15-30
LORENZO LEE BEAN, III

ORDER

This 18th day of August 2015 came Jamey E. Cook, the Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney and Russell L. Rabb, III, the Senior Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney, and Lorenzo Lee Bean, III, who stands indicted for nine felonies, to-wit: six counts of Embezzlement (Section 18.2-11), Money Laundering (Section 18.2-246.3) and two counts of False Statement on Tax Returns (Section 58.1-348), appeared in Court in accordance with the conditions of the recognizance and was set to bar.

And came also Thomas Plofchan and T. Daniel Griffin, counsel for the defendant.

Counsel for the defendant having filed a Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial and Investigative Misconduct, the Court proceeded to hear evidence and argument by counsel for the defendant and the Commonwealth, and, for the reasons stated to the record, said motion is granted, and

It is ORDERED that the indictments in case numbers CR14-540 through CR14-546 shall be and are hereby dismissed, and the Clerk of this Court shall file theses cases among the ended criminal cases of this Court.

Exception of the Commonwealth is noted.

Counsel for the defendant moved that the motions and witness subpoenas previously filed in this matter are hereby withdrawn, and there being no objection by the Commonwealth and for the reasons stated to the record, it is ORDERED that the previously filed motions and requested subpoena, set before the Court are hereby withdrawn.

Attorneys for the Commonwealth advised the Court that it would be the Commonwealth's desire not to prosecute further on the charges in case numbers CR15-29 and CR15-30, objection noted by counsel for the defendant, and for the reasons stated to the record, it is ORDERED that the said cases stand nolle prosequi at this time and the Clerk shall file the case among the ended criminal cases of this Court. Exception of counsel for the defendant is noted.

And the defendant is freed from the conditions of the recognizance and allowed to depart.
A copy of this order shall be forwarded to the Attorney for the Commonwealth, and counsel for the defendant.

ENTER this 18th day of August 2015.
David H. Beck, Judge Designate

Dominion Reporting

Wednesday, August 26, 2015

Alex Kozinski - My Kind of Judge

These three articles show why I have come to appreciate Judge Alex Kozinski
  1. Reasons to doubt the justice of our Criminal Justice System (clues for attacking the prosecutor's case)
  1. Prosecutorial Misconduct has become RAMPANT in the US (clues for nulling indictments)
  1. Reforms that could prevent Prosecutorial Misconduct (maybe someday, Honey)

Wednesday, August 19, 2015

Trump Is Right: Anchor Babies Do Not Rightfully Become US Citizens

Recently Donald Trump disagreed with Bill O'Reilly on the subject of anchor babies in a Fox News interview.  Trump said they do not have US Citizenship.


"Bill, I don't think that they have American citizenship," he said. "And if you speak to some very, very good lawyers — and I know some would disagree, but many of them agree with me — you're going to find they do not have American citizenship. We have to start a process where we take back our country. Our country is going to hell."

O'Reilly says anchor babies do have US citizenship because of the 14th Amendment guarantee that people born or naturalized in the US and subject to its jurisdiction are US Citizens.

Legally, Trump is right and O'Reilly is wrong. Anchor babies are not American citizens even though born in the US because the parents came to the US specifically and only to get the benefits that accrue to them as a consequence of the child's citizen status. First there's the question of being subject to US jurisdiction as children of aliens. Second there's the practical issue of common sense of having ALIEN parents in total control of the child rearing process, and thereby alienating the child against the culture, government, or citizenry. REAL danger comes from alien Islamic terrorists procreating children in the US just to get the benefits of that citizenship, including hamstringing their own deportation.

We see an example of common sense restrictions of constitutionally guaranteed rights in the laws surrounding the 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The right does not apply to children under the age of 16, 18, or 21, depending on territory and weapon type, or to convicted felons or the mentally defective or illegal aliens, and the law exempts some arms like explosive devices.

And the First Amendment right of freedom of speech does not extend to libel or slander or making false statements to a government employee in performance of duty.

You see? Practical and common sense limits exist to constitutionally guaranteed rights. And such a limit definitely becomes warranted against the granting of citizenship to anchor babies whose parents rear them to have split national loyalties.

It will take a person like Donald Trump in the US Presidency to push through enactment of legislation denying US Citizenship to anchor babies, and to force the issue to a head in the US courts.

See the news story here:

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/bill-oreilly-confronts-donald-trump-130408796.html

DOES THE CREDITOR OWE THE BORROWER A LOAN MOD?




DOES THE CREDITOR OWE THE BORROWER A LOAN MOD?


Many people have suffered when servicers lied to them about the need to miss payments in order to qualify for a loan modification.  But lenders owe borrowers no duty to give them loan modifications.
Lueras, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 68 (defendants "did not have a common law duty of care to offer, consider, or approve a loan modification, or to offer [plaintiff] alternatives to foreclosure," nor "a duty of care to handle [plaintiff]'s loan `in such a way to prevent foreclosure and forfeiture of his property;'" however, "a lender does owe a duty to a borrower to not make material misrepresentations about the status of an application for a loan modification.")
Borrowers should get all loan mod offers in writing, particularly claims that the borrower must miss payments to qualify.
Remember:  An oral agreement isn't worth the paper it's written on!

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

You Can Live as a Volunteer Minister

Some of you have known me or known of me for a decade or more.  You have read my writings with more or less agreement.  What do you find common about them?  How would you characterize my approach to the world?

In a nutshell, I am a Swami... a Volunteer Minister... an Evangelist.

I study, I lecture, and I write to improve civilization, improve our world, and help others.  I strive to share insights to problems, clarify practical and ideal solutions to them, and encourage people to implement those solutions.

Some, but not many, people disagree with my approach, analyses, position, solution, etc.  I don't consider those who disagree as nut cases.  Most of they time they put emphasis on different importances from those I emphasize.  But I remain forever a student, willing to learn new insights into the complexities of evolving a high quality civilization as the people of this world inexorably slog along to an Age of Light and Life in our far distant future.  I simply try to guide the slogging in an appropriate direction.

VOLUNTEER MINISTER TOOLS

I have adopted certain tools of guidance as my favorites.

  1. The Urantia Book - I consider this modern revelation and masterpiece of American Language literature as the ultimate guide book for humanity.  It is my absolute favorite, and I commend all to its reading and the embrace of its noble truths centered in the Fatherhood of God and Brotherhood of Man.  I have studied and applied its teachings since 1971.

  2. Scientology Handbook  (formerly, the Volunteer Minister's Handbook)- I thoroughly appreciate the practical applications of this collection of writings by American author and philosopher L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the so-called religion of Scientology.  It contains workable answers to the problems people face in their lives. I have used the technology to bring about improvements in people's lives since 1977.

  3. The Holy Bible - many aspire to follow the ideals in this collection of ancient writings.  I consider it good to know those ideals so as to understand and support those who want to follow the ideals.  I do not consider the book historically accurate or philosophically consistent, and I put the Holy Qur'an in a similar category.  I look at both books as a banquet table laden with a feast of dishes prepared by a variety of cooks, from foragers and cave men, to gourmet chefs, to enlightened modern nutritionists.  I discourage banquet guests from eating the centerpiece and plates.  I encourage them to seek the fare of enlightened nutritionists, so to speak.  My parents started sending me at age 4 to Sunday School to learn Bible teachings in 1947. I started studying the Qur'an in 1978.

AMBITION - YOU CAN BECOME A VOLUNTEER MINISTER

If YOU want to live as a Volunteer Minister and develop greater abilities to help others, I encourage you to focus your attention on Tools 1 and 2 above - the Urantia Book and Scientology Handbook. Buy a copy of each.  Study them.  Apply them in your living.  Encourage others to do the same. Download or browse the texts and learn them so they can become your very own internal tools for solving the problems of the world around you.

Then CONFESS to others that you have become a Volunteer Minister, and that you intend to use the above technologies to improve your own life, help others improve their lives, and to evolve an idealized human civilization on our world.

You cannot have a more noble ambition.

Bob Hurt, ConcernedBob Hurt         Blog 1 2 3   f  t  
2460 Persian Drive #70
Clearwater, FL 33763
Email; Call: (727) 669-5511
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Saturday, July 25, 2015

Foreclosure Statute of Limitations Leaves Bad Taste in Judge's Mouth - In Re: Washington


"...with figurative hand holding the nose, the Court, for the reasons
set forth below, will grant Debtor's motion for summary judgment."
"The Court will proceed to gargle in an effort to remove the lingering bad taste."
In the case I linked above, the New Jersey US Bankruptcy court denied foreclosure of an unpaid mortgage because the claimant securitization trust FAILED to sue within 6 years after it had accelerated the note because of non-payment. The New Jersey 6 year foreclosure statute of limitations, enacted in 2009 as an adjunct to the 1995 Fair Foreclosure Act, forbids foreclosure later than 6 years after accelerating the note.
I see the banks' moaning about this decision as an effort to have their cake and eat it too. The bank accelerates the note, making the whole balance due immediately, but still wants the statute of limitations to expire AFTER the originally scheduled maturity date of the note(typically 20 or 30 years.)
A similar dispute has arisen in Florida, and the courts simply cannot face the reality that creditors who fail properly to litigate
foreclosure deserve to lose their claim against the borrower. The Florida Supreme Court has failed to weigh in on the matter so far, but has granted certiorari to determine whether the Statute of Limitations applies to accelerated notes. See Bartram v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 140 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), cert granted, (Fla. Sept. 11, 2014)(No. SC14-1265).
The Third District has opined that a dismissal with prejudice
de-accelerates the note as a matter of law. I disagree, but anyway see Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Beauvais, 3D14-575, 2014 WL 7156961 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). The Third DCA also held that a threat to accelerate does not constitute an acceleration. See Snow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 160326 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 14, 2015).

In my opinion, a threat to accelerate does not constitute an
acceleration, but NO dismissal, with or without prejudice, stops the
statute of limitation clock from ticking or restarts it. The clock
starts ticking on the payment stream at the instant the first breach
occurs or on the entire amount of the note with accrued interest and
collection costs the instant the creditor accelerates the note.
The big rub in all this lies with the concept of acceleration. The borrower must make payments in a stream of payments, and every payment has an associated statute of limitations. But if,  because of a breach, the creditor accelerates the note, making the entire balance due and payable forthwith, the statute of limitations clock starts ticking at the acceleration because the payment stream obligation no longer exists, by operation of the law of the contract.
Let us back off from all this to see it in crystal clear context. What difference does a foreclosure or related statute of limitations make when the lender or others injured the borrower at the inception of the loan through such heinous acts as these:
  • appraisal fraud
  • loan application fraud
  • bait and switch tactics
  • excessive origination fees
  • excessive interest
?
A borrower who attacks the injurious parties over these can end up with millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages, or the house free and clear, without the gruelling terror of a foreclosure battle.
If you want to know how to find such injuries as those I listed above,
plus dozens more, visit this web site:
Then, give me a call
Bob Hurt
727 669 5511