Tuesday, October 13, 2015

Both Parties Must Tender in ANY rescission, including TILA

Rescission means making a contract null. It requires unwinding of the deal so as to restore the parties to "status quo ante," or "pre-contract condition."  The unwinding requires the creditor to remove any lien and both creditor and borrower to tender payment back to each other of what they received from each other.  See the below definitions, court opinions, and law references.

Definitions


RESCIND.  To abrogate, annul, avoid, or cancel a contract; particularly, nullifying a contract by the act of a party.  See Powell v Lince Co., 29 Misc. Rep. 419, 60 N. Y. Supp 1044; Hurst v. Trow Printing Co., 2 Misc. Rep. 361, 22 N. Y. Supp. 371.

Black's Law Dictionary
2nd Edition (1910)


rescind (ri-sind), vb. (17c) 1. To abrogate or cancel (a contract) unilaterally or by agreement. [Cases: Contracts C=c249.] 2. To make void; to repeal or annul <rescind the legislation>. 3. Parliamentary law. To void, repeal, or nullify a main motion adopted earlier.
Also termed annul; repeal. rescindable, adj. rescind and expunge. See EXPUNGE (2).

rescission (ri-sizh-an), n. (17c) 1. A party's unilateral unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient reason, such as the other party's material breach, or a judgment rescinding the contract; VOIDAKCE.• Rescission is generally available as a remedy or defense for a nondefaulting party and is accompanied by restitution of any partial performance, thus restoring the parties to their precontractual positions. Also termed avoidance. [Cases: Contracts G='249.] 2. An agreement by contracting parties to discharge all remaining duties of performance and terminate the contract. - Also spelled recision; recission. - Also termed (in sense 2) agreement of rescission; mutual rescission; abandonment.

Cf. REJECTION (2); REPUDIATION (2); REVOCATION (1). [Cases: Contracts G=252.] - rescissory (ri-sis-<lree or ri-siz-), adj.
"The [UCC] takes cognizance of the fact that the term 'rescission' is often used by lawyers, courts and businessmen in many different senses; for example, termination of a contract by virtue of an option to terminate in the agreement, cancellation for breach and avoidance on the grounds of infancy or fraud. In the interests of clarity of thought - as the consequences of each of these forms of discharge may vary the Commercial Code carefully distinguishes three circumstances. 'Rescission' is utilized as a term of art to refer to a mutual agreement to discharge contractual duties. 'Termination' refers to the discharge of duties by the exercise of a power granted by the agreement. 'Cancellation' refers to the putting an end to the contract by reason of a breach by the other party. Section 2-720, however, takes into account that the parties do not necessarily use these terms in this way." John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 21-2. at 864-65 (3d ed. 1987).

equitable rescission. (1889) Rescission that is decreed by a court of equity. [Cases: Cancellation of Instruments (;::; 1.]

legal rescission. (1849) 1. Rescission that is effected by the agreement of the parties. [Cases: Contracts C=> 251.] 2. Rescission that is decreed by a court of law, as
opposed to a court of equity.
"The modern tendency is to treat rescission as equitable, but rescission was often available at law. If plaintiff had paid money, or had delivered goods. he could rescind by tendering whatever he had received from defendant and suing at law to recover his money or replevy his goods. But if he had delivered a promissory note or securities, or conveyed real estate, rescission required the court to cancel the instruments or compel defendant to reconvey. This relief was available only in equity. Many modern courts ignore the distinction .... But versions of the distinction are codified in some states:' Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies 627-28 (3d ed. 2002).

Black's Law Dictionary 9th Edition (2009)


Court Opinions


"There is no reason why a court that may alter the sequence of procedures after deciding that rescission is warranted, may not do so before deciding that rescission is warranted when it finds that, assuming grounds for rescission exist, rescission still could not be enforced because the borrower cannot comply with the borrower's rescission obligations no matter what. Such a decision lies within the court's equitable discretion, taking into consideration all the circumstances including the nature of the violations and the borrower's ability to repay the proceeds. If … it is clear from the evidence that the borrower lacks capacity to pay back what she has received (less interest, finance charges, etc.), the court does not lack discretion to do before trial what it could do after. Determinations regarding rescission procedures shall be made on a "case-by-case basis, in light of the record adduced."
Yamamoto v. Bank of New York, 329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003)


Courts have equitable discretion to allow borrowers to tender via monthly payments.  In re Stuart, 367 B.R. 541, 552 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007); Shepeard v. Quality Sliding & Window Factory, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 1295 (D.Del.1990) (allowing borrower to satisfy tender obligation by making monthly payments); Mayfield v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 710 F.Supp. 143, 149 (E.D.Pa.1989) (allowing borrower to satisfy tender obligation by making monthly payment).


Law

15 U.S.C. §1635. Right of rescission as to certain transactions


http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title15/html/USCODE-2010-title15-chap41-subchapI-partB-sec1635.htm

(a) Disclosure of obligor's right to rescind

Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer credit transaction (including opening or increasing the credit limit for an open end credit plan) in which a security interest, including any such interest arising by operation of law, is or will be retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this section together with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this subchapter, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Board, of his intention to do so. The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously disclose, in accordance with regulations of the Board, to any obligor in a transaction subject to this section the rights of the obligor under this section. The creditor shall also provide, in accordance with regulations of the Board, appropriate forms for the obligor to exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section.

(b) Return of money or property following rescission

When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a) of this section, he is not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a rescission. Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the boligor any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction. If the creditor has delivered any property to the obligor, the obligor may retain possession of it. Upon the performance of the creditor's obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the creditor, except that if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or inequitable, the obligor shall tender its reasonable value. Tender shall be made at the location of the property or at the residence of the obligor, at the option of the obligor. If the creditor does not take possession of the property within 20 days after tender by the obligor, ownership of the property vests in the obligor without obligation on his part to pay for it. The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court.

(c) Rebuttable presumption of delivery of required disclosures

Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, written acknowledgment of receipt of any disclosures required under this subchapter by a person to whom information, forms, and a statement is required to be given pursuant to this section does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof.

(d) Modification and waiver of rights

The Board may, if it finds that such action is necessary in order to permit homeowners to meet bona fide personal financial emergencies, prescribe regulations authorizing the modification or waiver of any rights created under this section to the extent and under the circumstances set forth in those regulations.

(e) Exempted transactions; reapplication of provisions

This section does not apply to—

(1) a residential mortgage transaction as defined in section 1602(w) of this title;

(2) a transaction which constitutes a refinancing or consolidation (with no new advances) of the principal balance then due and any accrued and unpaid finance charges of an existing extension of credit by the same creditor secured by an interest in the same property;

(3) a transaction in which an agency of a State is the creditor; or

(4) advances under a preexisting open end credit plan if a security interest has already been retained or acquired and such advances are in accordance with a previously established credit limit for such plan.

(f) Time limit for exercise of right

An obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms required under this section or any other disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the obligor, except that if (1) any agency empowered to enforce the provisions of this subchapter institutes a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section within three years after the date of consummation of the transaction, (2) such agency finds a violation of this section, and (3) the obligor's right to rescind is based in whole or in part on any matter involved in such proceeding, then the obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the earlier sale of the property, or upon the expiration of one year following the conclusion of the proceeding, or any judicial review or period for judicial review thereof, whichever is later.

(g) Additional relief

In any action in which it is determined that a creditor has violated this section, in addition to rescission the court may award relief under section 1640 of this title for violations of this subchapter not relating to the right to rescind.

(h) Limitation on rescission

An obligor shall have no rescission rights arising solely from the form of written notice used by the creditor to inform the obligor of the rights of the obligor under this section, if the creditor provided the obligor the appropriate form of written notice published and adopted by the Board, or a comparable written notice of the rights of the obligor, that was properly completed by the creditor, and otherwise complied with all other requirements of this section regarding notice.

(i) Rescission rights in foreclosure

(1) In general

Notwithstanding section 1649 of this title, and subject to the time period provided in subsection (f) of this section, in addition to any other right of rescission available under this section for a transaction, after the initiation of any judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure process on the primary dwelling of an obligor securing an extension of credit, the obligor shall have a right to rescind the transaction equivalent to other rescission rights provided by this section, if—

(A) a mortgage broker fee is not included in the finance charge in accordance with the laws and regulations in effect at the time the consumer credit transaction was consummated; or

(B) the form of notice of rescission for the transaction is not the appropriate form of written notice published and adopted by the Board or a comparable written notice, and otherwise complied with all the requirements of this section regarding notice.

(2) Tolerance for disclosures

Notwithstanding section 1605(f) of this title, and subject to the time period provided in subsection (f) of this section, for the purposes of exercising any rescission rights after the initiation of any judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure process on the principal dwelling of the obligor securing an extension of credit, the disclosure of the finance charge and other disclosures affected by any finance charge shall be treated as being accurate for purposes of this section if the amount disclosed as the finance charge does not vary from the actual finance charge by more than $35 or is greater than the amount required to be disclosed under this subchapter.

(3) Right of recoupment under State law

Nothing in this subsection affects a consumer's right of rescission in recoupment under State law.

(4) Applicability

This subsection shall apply to all consumer credit transactions in existence or consummated on or after September 30, 1995



TILA Regulation Z 12 C.F.R.§ 1026


Stay Up To Date here:
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/eregulations/1026

12 C.F.R. § 1026.23 Rescission under Regulation Z

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2015-title12-vol9/pdf/CFR-2015-title12-vol9-sec1026-23.pdf

Appendix I.  Interpretation of Regulation Z by Consumer Financial Protection Burea (CFPB)

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2015-title12-vol9/pdf/CFR-2015-title12-vol9-part1026-appI-id89.pdf

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Bob Hurt            Blog 1 2   f  t  
2460 Persian Drive #70
Clearwater, FL 33763
Email me    Call: (727) 669-5511
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Saturday, October 10, 2015

Bradford Shows the Basics of Mortgage Attack in his own case


NORMAN BRADFORD SHOWS THAT THE COURTS LIKE RESCISSION and OTHER FORMS OF MORTGAGE ATTACK, etc, IF THE BORROWER ARTFULLY MANAGES THE ATTACK.

If you want to see a case where the court denied rescission pre-Jesinoski, but the court awarded damages and attorney fees to the plaintiff, and where the MORTGAGE ATTACK lawsuit shows you how to set up a win, read up on Bradford v HSBC.  Get the PACER docket report for this case:

1:09-cv-01226-TSE-JFA Bradford v. HSBC Mortgage Corporation et al

If you use the RECAP THE LAW extension in Firefox or Chrome browser, you can get an abbreviated docket report and some case docs FREE. Get the Docket Report I just ran HERE:

http://ia700409.us.archive.org/19/items/gov.uscourts.vaed.247729/gov.uscourts.vaed.247729.docket.html

You can get the case opinions at Google Scholar here.

22 July 2011 - Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 625 - Dist. Court, ED Virginia 2011
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10469497073493990651

8 Dec 2011 - Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 829 F. Supp. 2d 340 - Dist. Court, ED Virginia 2011
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16422283053088070918

5 March 2012-  Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 424 - Dist. Court, ED Virginia 2012
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15611931269908753326

26 April 2012- Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 859 F. Supp. 2d 783 - Dist. Court, ED Virginia 2012
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11349799512745292008


This case has not ended yet, partly because the creditor filed for bankruptcy and has not come out yet. 

As the above opinions show, Bradford took out a refi loan in 2006, and paid on it for two years even thought the loan broker had lied, bait and switched him, then Bradford send the lender a justified notice of rescission in 2008.  He sued for TILA rescission, for related damages including credit reputation damage for failure of the creditor to remove the lien and to tender after he offered to tender, for FDCPA violations for trying to collect a rescinded debt, for RESPA violations because the servicer refused to tell him the identity of the creditor (for which Bradford won costs, $4K damage, and over $25K legal fees), and for wrongful foreclosure.  He filed the lawsuit 1 year and 16 days after sending notice of rescission.

Document 56 shows that a competent plaintiff like Bradford can craft a multi-count complaint so that it sails past a motion to dismiss with flying colors.  The judge analyzes the complaint carefully and seems to love it.

The court ended up dismissing the rescission complaint because the 4th Circuit had opined that the borrower must sue within 3 years after closing, and Bradford sued a little over 4 years after closing.  Thereafter, the 4th Circuit changed its view about the timing of rescission lawsuit, incidentally aligning with the Jesinoski opinion.

After the creditor comes out of bankruptcy, Bradford will have the ability to challenge the rescission dismissal in light of later Circuit position on suing for rescission, and in light of Jesinoski.  The court would, of course, reverse the dismissal and order the unwinding of the loan.  However, Bradford will have a considerable amount of setoffs, and the creditor knows it.

So, instead of challenging the dismissal right off, he can demand a settlement from the creditor ("Give me the house free and clear and call us even").  He will point out how badly he has beat up his adversaries already, and how much more he will beat them up with the rescission and setoffs and enormous legal fees, etc.  They might make him a suitable counter offer.  Or he might have to take them back to court.  Time will tell.

Regardless, Bradford has not made a house payment since late 2008, he does not have to make payments because of the justified rescission, and interest stopped accruing on his debt in 2008, giving him free use of that money in the form of his house

In summary, Norman Bradford has, though his case, conducted a Mortgage Attack seminar for anyone wanting to know how to beat up the bank and its team members.  The pleadings sit there on PACER for you to study.

Friday, October 09, 2015

Kill in self-defense and Collect $200K, or Death for Crooked Prosecutors?

Check out this proposed Florida law, and ponder it for a while.

​
http://www.f169bbs.com/bbs/news/175453-what-are-they-thinking-proposed-florida-law-you-get-200k-after-killing-someone-and-then-claiming-self-defense

Some people might hate or feel shocked by the above idea, but I like it, up to a point.  Think about the plight of George Zimmerman in the aftermath of shooting and killing Negro thug Trayvon Martin in self-defense while Martin tried to beat Zimmerman to death.  How would you like to suffer the humiliation, the hatred of Negroes across the USA, the jail time, and the COST of a legal team?  $200,000 would barely scratch the surface of overall costs.

However, I feel worried about the fact that many self-defense survivors become the victims of overzealous prosecutors who will do anything, including violating their loyalty oaths and betraying the public trust, to win their case.

Prosecutorial misconduct constitutes the grandest justification of all for restraining prosecutors because prosecutors across the land have become positively CRIMINAL in their zeal to get unwarranted convictions, by intimidating defendants into accepting wrongful plea deals, manufacturing evidence, hiding evidence, suborning witnesses and jurors, manipulating the court and its records, and any trick or deception they can dream up.  They have become a danger to the populace and a scourge worse than most of the "criminals" they prosecute.  And the George Zimmerman case constitutes a prime example.

Esteemed Jurist Alex Kozinski wrote an excellent preface to the Georgetown Law Journal subtitled "Criminal Law 2.0."  Download and read it here:

http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/06/Kozinski_Preface.pdf

Kozinski describes the many reasons criminal prosecutions should fail, and he focuses considerable attention on prosecutorial misconduct.  The article will provide an eye-opening education for those who think of prosecutors as the good guy.

A New York Times editorial from 5 January 2014 discusses Kozinski and refers to prosecutorial misconduct as "rampant."

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sunday/rampant-prosecutorial-misconduct.html?_r=0

Prosecutor crimes against victims, like judicial malfeasance, continues unabated because of the immunity they enjoy, even though no Constitution grants them such immunity nor authorizes governments to give them immunity.

Enacting the above proposed law would put deserved pressure on prosecutors to prosecute honestly ONLY those cases they should prosecute.  And self-defense cases don't fit into that category.  The $200K should comes OUT OF THE STATE ATTORNEY BUDGET, and then only if the state removes prosecutorial immunity for abuse of authority and for prosecutorial misconduct.

Unfortunately, many prosecutors, police officers, judges, and elected /appointed officials fall into the class of people who betray the public trust.  So the $200K award, if the Legislature approves it, will probably a terribly negative effect.  It will make prosecutors work extra hard AND CROOKEDLY, with impunity under immunity, to convict those who kill in self-defense.

To Activists:  get busy and circulate a petition demanding a law imposing the DEATH PENALTY on public employees who betray the public trust and strengthening the Grand Jury system so that it investigates all evidence of crimes at the behest of the prosecutor OR the public, and so that judges and prosecutors and sheriffs cannot obstruct the public's assess to the grand jury for reporting crimes and malfeasance by public officers. 

ONLY that will properly deter crime in and by government.

Saturday, October 03, 2015

Florida 1st District Affirms $250K Punitive Damage Award in Pate v BOA

All of you who simply cannot believe that borrowers can beat the bank by proving the bank and its agents and allies injured the borrower, TAKE HEART.  Here I present a crystal clear example of the MORTGAGE ATTACK methodology:

Bank of America, NA v. Pate, 159 So. 3d 383 - Fla: Dist. Court of Appeals, 1st Dist. 2015

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9278967945135979893

Don't waste your time whining about the banking industry, fractional reserve lending, the Federal Reserve, the money system, securitization, and such irrelevancies.  Get a mortgage examination if necessary to find the causes of action, and use them to HAMMER the lender, creditor, servicer, appraiser, loan broker, closer, title company, etc (whoever hurt you) IN COURT.

As you can see, the Florida appeals court upheld the BENCH TRIAL (not jury) award of $250,000 in PUNITIVE DAMAGES and over $60,000 in compensatory damages for the INJURIES the BANK did to the BORROWER.  The Pates could probably have won much more in a jury trial.
If you want to deploy the MORTGAGE ATTACK strategy in your own mortgage dispute, visit http://MortgageAttack.com to learn what works and what does not.
159 So.3d 383 (2015)

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., and Third-Party Defendant, Homefocus Services, LLC, Appellants,
v.
Phillip V. PATE and Barbara Pate, Robert L. Pohlman and Marcia L. Croom, Appellees.

No. 1D14-251.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 16, 2015.
J. Randolph Liebler and Tricia J. Duthiers of Liebler, Gonzalez & Portuondo, Miami, for Appellants.
384*384 Jonna L. Bowman of Law Office of Jonna Bowman, Blountstown, for Appellees.
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.
ROWE and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur; THOMAS, J., CONCURS SPECIALLY WITH OPINION.
THOMAS, J., Specially Concurring.
In this civil foreclosure case, the trial court found that Appellant Bank of America (the Bank) engaged in egregious and intentional misconduct in Appellee Pates' (Pate) purchase of a residential home. Thus, based on the trial court's finding that the Bank had unclean hands in this equity action, it did not reversibly err in denying the foreclosure action and granting a deed in lieu of foreclosure. In addition, the trial court did not err in ruling in favor of the Pates in their counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud, and awarding them $250,000 in punitive damages and $60,443.29 in compensatory damages, against the Bank and its affiliate, Homefocus Services, LLC, which provided the flawed appraisal discussed below. Finally, the trial court did not reversibly err in granting injunctive relief and thereby ordering the Bank to take the necessary measures to correct the Pates' credit histories.
In the bench trial below, the trial court found that the Bank assured the Pates, based on the appraisal showing the home's value far exceeded the $50,000 mortgage loan, that it would issue a home equity loan in addition to the mortgage loan. This was a precondition to the Pates' agreement to purchase the home, which was in very poor condition but had historical appeal for the Pates. The Pates intended to restore the home, but needed the home equity loan to facilitate restoration.
Before the closing on the property, the Bank informed the Pates that it would close on the home equity loan "later," after the mortgage loan was issued. The Bank later refused to issue the home equity loan, in part on the ground that the appraisal issued by Homefocus was flawed. The Pates were forced to invest all of their savings and much of their own labor in extensive repairs. Thus, the trial court found that the Pates detrimentally relied on the representations of the Bank that it would issue the home equity loan. The record supports the trial court's conclusion that the Bank acted with reckless disregard constituting intentional misconduct by the Bank. See generally,Lance v. Wade, 457 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Fla.1984) ("[E]lements for actionable fraud are (1) a false statement concerning a material fact; (2) knowledge by the person ... that the representation is false; (3) the intent ... [to] induce another to act on it; and (4) reliance on the representation to the injury of the other party. In summary, there must be an intentional material misrepresentation upon which the other party relies to his detriment.").
The trial court further found that the Pates complied with the Bank's demand to obtain an insurance binder to provide premiums for annual coverage, and that the Bank agreed to place these funds in escrow, utilizing the binder to pay the first year of coverage and calculate future charges to the Pates. Although the Pates fulfilled this contractual obligation, the Bank failed to correctly utilize the escrow funds. Consequently, the Pates' insurance policy was ultimately cancelled due to nonpayment. The Pates attempted to obtain additional coverage but were unsuccessful due to the home's structural condition. The Bank then obtained a force-placed policy with $334,800 in coverage and an annual premium of $7,382.98, which was 385*385 included on the mortgage loan, quadrupling the Pate's mortgage payment.
The Pates offered to pay the original $496.34 monthly mortgage payment, but the Bank refused, demanding a revised mortgage payment of $2,128.74. The trial court found it "disturbing that Bank of America could financially profit due to [the Bank's] failure to pay the home insurance.... [T]he profits for one or more months of forced place insurance would have been substantial."
The trial court further found that during the four years of litigation following the Pates' default, the Bank's agents entered the Pate's home several times while the Pates resided there, attempted to remove furniture, and placed locks on the exterior doors. Following the Bank's action, the Pates had to have the locks changed so their family could enter the residence. During two of the intrusions, the Pates were required to enlist the aid of the sheriff to force the Bank's agent to leave their home. The trial court found as fact that, due to the Bank's multiple intrusions into their home, the Pates were forced to obtain alternative housing for 28 months, at a cost of thousands of dollars.
The Bank's actions supported the trial court's finding that punitive damages were awardable. In Estate of Despain v. Avante Group, Inc., 900 So.2d 637, 640 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), the court held that "[p]unishment of the wrongdoer and deterrence of similar wrongful conduct in the future, rather than compensation of the injured victim, are the primary policy objectives of punitive damage awards." See also Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So.2d 483 (Fla.1999); W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Waters, 638 So.2d 502 (Fla.1994).
In Estate of Despain, the court held that "[t]o merit an award of punitive damages, the defendant's conduct must transcend the level of ordinary negligence and enter the realm of willful and wanton misconduct...." 900 So.2d at 640. Florida courts have defined such conduct as including an "entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows... reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them." Id. (quoting White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So.2d 1026, 1029 (Fla.1984)). Here, the Bank's intent to defraud was shown by its reckless disregard for its actions. The facts showing the Bank's "conscious indifference to consequences" and "reckless indifference" to the rights of the Pates is the same as an intentional act violating their rights. See White Constr. Co., 455 So.2d at 1029. The record evidence provides ample support for the trial court's ruling in favor of the Pates' claim for punitive damages against the Bank.
The learned trial judge found that the Bank's actions demonstrated its unclean hands; therefore, the Bank was not entitled to a foreclosure judgment in equity. Unclean hands is an equitable defense, akin to fraud, to discourage unlawful activity. SeeCongress Park Office Condos II, LLC v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 105 So.3d 602, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ("It is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief[.]") (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945)). The totality of the circumstances established the Bank's unclean hands, precluding it from benefitting by its actions in a court of equity. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying the foreclosure action.

Thursday, October 01, 2015

CA court affirms $250K for dual tracking in Bergman v JPMCB

CA court affirms $250K for dual tracking in Bergman v JPMCB

Read the opinion here:
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/E060148.PDF

This California 4th District appellate opinion contains a treasure trove of virtual advice for borrowers whom the lender scammed with a fake loan mod while foreclosing on him at the same time ("dual tracking."

The panel fully supported the opinion of the trial court which awarded Bergman $250,000 in damages plus legal fees.  The court would have awarded him much more had Bergman's attorney hired Law Partner On Call (http://lawpartneroncall.com) to manage the litigation, write the pleadings, and write the jury instructions. 

Bergman got his payday for breach of contract by his creditor, but he made a bunch of mistakes. 

For example, he did not include an attorney fees provision in his loan security instrument (that standard form only says the creditor can recover legal fees and costs) in the event the court finds that the creditor or servicer or other agent engaged in wrongdoing that injured the borrower.  The court awarded Bergman fees anyway, but against great opposition by the creditor.  Most borrowers make the same mistake.

And, Bergman failed to add to the security instrument that a special penalty attaches to dual tracking, a scam that virtually every lender has run on desperate borrowers who want a loan mod.

Furthermore, Bergman made the same mistake many do in loan mod negotiations - he failed to record the name and ID# of everyone he talked to at the bank, and he failed to get a signed writing saying he had to miss payments in order to qualify for the loan mod, and that if he missed them, then made proper trial payments, the lender would grant the loan mod.  Everything was oral leading up to the actual mod.  And oral agreements have no more value than the paper on which the parties wrote them.  The lender's attorney blustered about it, but the court ruled that the parties had indeed make that agreement, then failed to give Bergman a loan mod.  I believe many courts, faced with similar facts, have ruled that no agreement existed.

Bergman's most monumental mistake:  he failed to hire a competent professional to examine his loan documents for evidence of torts, contract and regulatory breaches, and legal errors.  Had he done that, and lodge those as claims in his complaint, he could have won gargantuan damages award because, almost certainly, fraud underlay his loan.

Bergman while in the right, found uncommon good luck in this litigation.  Many borrowers have lost using his paper-thin arguments.

READ THE OPINION thoroughly, especially if you have a mortgage and consider a loan mod.

But if you really want to win, call me right now at 727 669 5511 and schedule a mortgage examination, whether or not you face foreclosure.  Read all about what wins and what does not win at http://mortgageattack.com.
--

Bob Hurt            Blog 1 2    f  t  
2460 Persian Drive #70
Clearwater, FL 33763
Email Call: (727) 669-5511
Law Studies: Donate 
Learn to Litigate with Jurisdictionary
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Saturday, September 26, 2015

Lying IRS Assessments and 26 USC § 83

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n:Hurt;Bob
org:Bob Hurt Publishing
adr:;;2460 Persian Drive #70;Clearwater;Florida;33763-1925;USA
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Chris Chapman likes to help people prevent a tax crime indictment, inexpensively.

You can write to the IRS and demand an assessment if you have tax deficiency problems.  If you receive an alleged assessment in a computer printout from the IRS, call Chris at 321 264 6383 to discuss how to deal with it. 

You might use the government as a witness that "one cannot rely upon the accuracy of computer generated documents." The GAO has said the equivalent of this about IRS documents since 1992.  You might ask the DOJ for documents that would not be considered inaccurate or unreliable.  Most likely they will respond that they know of no such documents.

Regarding whether you owe a tax on money you received in exchange for your personal services (labor, etc), the information below speaks for itself...

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2015 11:01:00 -0400
From: Chris Chapman at AMERICAN LIBERTIES <americanliberties@cfl.rr.com>
 
26 U.S. Code Chapter 1, Subchapter B - Computation of Taxable Income
PART II—ITEMS SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN GROSS INCOME (§§ 71–90)
§ 83. Property transferred in connection with performance of services
(a) General rule
If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess of—
(1) the fair market value of such property (determined without regard to any restriction other than a restriction which by its terms will never lapse) at the first time the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property, shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services in the first taxable year in which the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable. The preceding sentence shall not apply if such person sells or otherwise disposes of such property in an arm's length transaction before his rights in such property become transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
Now, to put it all into prospective now read:
If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess of … the fair market value of such property … over … the amount (if any) paid for such property, shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services…

Simplified
 GET MORE SPECIFIC INFO FROM http://wevgov.com

Chris Chapman (Chappy)
(321)264-6383

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Friday, September 18, 2015

Nationstar v Brown - Statute of Limitations No Defense Against Foreclosure

Statute of Limitations Applies to Whole Payment Stream

By Bob Hurt, 18 September 2015
Florida’s 1st District Appellate Court gave Germaine and Andrea Brown a rude awakening by telling them the Florida foreclosure 5-year statute of limitations does not apply a 30-year stream of mortgage payments even after the creditor accelerates the loan, making the entire balance immediately due and payable.  The panel cited the Florida Supreme Court opinion in Singleton v Greymar (2004) as the controlling authority (“the unique nature of the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship.”).  The panel held that “the subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.”  In other words, every default of a scheduled payment provides a new right to sue, throughout the original term of the loan.

The panel admitted that Florida’s 3rd District had reached a contrary conclusion in Deutsche Bank v Beauvais (2014).  But the panel harked to the USDC adverse opinion in Stern v BOA (2015) which claimed that Beauvis opinion went against ”overwhelming weight of authority.”  Now the Beauvais court plans to review its decision.

This should make it abundantly clear that the foreclosure statute of limitations in Florida does not constitute a valid defense against foreclosure, except on payments more than 5 years overdue on which the creditor has failed to take action.

Why should this matter to mortgage victims facing foreclosure?  Because you cannot depend on Foreclosure Defense to defeat foreclosure.  The court/trustee will NOT give you a free house.

ONLY ONE methodology gives home loan borrowers a reliable chance beat the appraiser, mortgage broker, title company, servicer, and creditor in a mortgage dispute:  MORTGAGE ATTACK.  Borrowers must ATTACK THE VALIDITY OF THE LOAN, and to do that, they must get a comprehensive mortgage examination.

If you have a mortgage dispute, contact Mortgage Attack NOW for a full explanation of the ONLY WINNING METHODOLOGY.





NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC v. Brown, Fla: Dist. Court of Appeals, 1st Dist. 2015
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellant,
v.
GERMAINE R. BROWN a/k/a GERMAINE R. BROWN; ANDREA E. BROWN, Appellees.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Opinion filed August 24, 2015.

Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee; William P. Heller of Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale; Celia C. Falzone of Akerman LLP, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Jared D. Comstock of John F. Hayter, Attorney at Law, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellees.
KELSEY, J.

Appellant challenges a final summary judgment holding that the statute of limitations bars appellant's action to foreclose the subject mortgage. We agree with appellant that the statute of limitations did not bar the action. Thus, we reverse.

It is undisputed that appellees have failed to make any mortgage payments since February 2007, the first month in which they defaulted. In April 2007, appellant's predecessor in interest gave notice of its intent to accelerate the note based on the February 2007 breach, and filed a foreclosure action. However, the trial court dismissed that action without prejudice in October 2007, after counsel for the lender failed to attend a case management conference.

The next relevant event occurred in November 2010, when appellant sent appellees a new notice of intent to accelerate, based on appellees' breach in March 2007 and subsequent breaches. Appellees took no action to cure the default, and appellant filed a new foreclosure action in November 2012. Appellees asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, arguing that the new action and any future foreclosure actions were barred because they were not filed within five years after the original 2007 acceleration of the note. § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012) (establishing five year statute of limitations on action to foreclose a mortgage).

The principles set forth in Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004), apply in this case. In Singleton, the Florida Supreme Court recognized "the unique nature of the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship." 882 So. 2d at 1007 (emphasis added). The court sought to avoidboth unjust enrichment of a defaulting mortgagor, and inequitable obstacles "prevent[ing] mortgagees from being able to challenge multiple defaults on a mortgage." Id. at 1007-08. Giving effect to those principles in light of the continuing obligations of a mortgage, the court held that "the subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action." Id. at 1008. The court found it irrelevant whether acceleration had been sought in earlier foreclosure actions. Id. The court's analysis in Singleton recognizes that a note securing a mortgage creates liability for a total amount of principal and interest, and that the lender's acceptance of payments in installments does not eliminate the borrower's ongoing liability for the entire amount of the indebtedness.

The present case illustrates good grounds for the Singleton court's concern with avoiding both unjust enrichment of borrowers and inequitable infringement on lenders' remedies. Judgments such as that under review run afoul of Singleton because they release defaulting borrowers from their entire indebtedness and preclude mortgagees from collecting the total debt evidenced by the notes securing the mortgages they hold, even though the sum of the installment payments not made during the limitations period represents only a fraction of the total debt. See GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Whiddon, 164 So. 3d 97, 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (dismissal of earlier foreclosure action "did not absolve the Whiddons of their responsibility to make mortgage payments for the remaining twenty-five years of their mortgage agreement"). We further observe that both the note and the mortgage at issue here contain typical provisions reflecting the parties' agreement that the mortgagee's forbearance or inaction do not constitute waivers or release appellees from their obligation to pay the note in full. These binding contractual terms refute appellees' arguments and are inconsistent with the judgment under review.

We have held previously that not even a dismissal with prejudice of a foreclosure action precludes a mortgagee "from instituting a new foreclosure action based on a different act or a new date of default not alleged in the dismissed action." PNC Bank, N.A. v. Neal, 147 So. 3d 32, 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); see also U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007, 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 160 So. 3d 892 (Fla. 2014) (Case No. SC14-1305) (dismissal of earlier foreclosure action, whether with or without prejudice, did not bar subsequent foreclosure action based on a new default);Evergrene Partners, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 143 So. 3d 954, 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)(foreclosure and acceleration based on an earlier default "does not bar subsequent actions and acceleration based upon different events of default"). The dismissal in this case 
was without prejudice, so much the more preserving appellant's right to file a new foreclosure action based on appellees' breaches subsequent to the February 2007 breach asserted as the procedural trigger of the earlier foreclosure action. We find that appellant's assertion of the right to accelerate was not irrevocably "exercised" within the meaning of cases defining accrual for foreclosure actions, when the right was merely asserted and then dismissed without prejudice. See Olympia Mortg. Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So. 2d 863, 866-67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("By voluntarily dismissing the suit, [the mortgagee] in effect decided not to accelerate payment on the note and mortgage at that time."); see also Slottow v. Hull Inv. Co., 129 So. 577, 582 (Fla. 1930) (a mortgagee could waive an acceleration election in certain circumstances). After the dismissal without prejudice, the parties returned to the status quo that existed prior to the filing of the dismissed complaint. As a matter of law, appellant's 2012 foreclosure action, based on breaches that occurred after the breach that triggered the first complaint, was not barred by the statute of limitations. Evergrene, 143 So. 3d at 955 ("[T]he statute of limitations has not run on all of the payments due pursuant to the note, and the mortgage is still enforceable based upon subsequent acts of default.").

We are aware that the Third District has reached a contrary conclusion in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Beauvais, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D1, 2014 WL 7156961 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 17, 2014) (Case No. 3D14-575). A federal district court has refused to follow Beauvais, noting that it is "contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority." Stern v. Bank of America Corp., 2015 WL 3991058 at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2015) (No. 2:15-cv-153-FtM-29CM). The court in Beauvais acknowledges that its conclusion is contrary to the weight of authority on the questions presented. 2014 WL 7156961, at *8-9. That court's docket shows that the court has set the case for rehearing en banc; it remains to be seen whether the merits disposition will change.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on appellant's foreclosure action.

THOMAS and MARSTILLER, JJ., CONCUR.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.